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Multi-tasking and strategic human performance are everywhere. For example, imagine
that as you approach a busy intersection, the traffic signal changes to yellow. Do you slow
down and wait until the light turns green, or do you speed up and hope to beat the red light?
Or imagine that you are working on an e-mail when the phone rings. Do you immediately
answer the phone, or do you finish the sentence you are writing and then answer? Or
imagine that you are driving your car when your cell phone rings. Should you answer? If
so, how closely do you focus on this conversation, and how closely on your driving?
All of these scenarios involve deciding what strategy to perform when you have to make
a decision quickly. The traffic-signal scenario is a classic example of the speed-accuracy
tradeoff (SAT; Pachella, 1974). If you slow down and wait for a green light, you are sure
not to break the law, but you have a delay before proceeding. If you accelerate, you do not
have to wait as long, but you may run a red light and risk getting a ticket or into an accident.
So what should people choose? What if you are late for an important job interview? What
if another ticket would cause you to have your driver’s license suspended? The present
dissertation investigates how people may answer such questions.
The critical importance of strategies in cognitive psychology have been known since
the study of perception via Signal-Detection Theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Sperling
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& Dosher, 1986). In these studies, experimenters were often interested in how sensitive
people were to a given stimulus or a given change in stimulus. But in order to under-
stand perceptual limitations, these researchers realized they had to control for strategic
differences. Two people with the same degree of sensitivity in a given stimulus modality
may nonetheless produce different results, because each person would deal with uncertain
stimuli depending on her bias toward a particular response. In order to isolate people’s
sensitivity, this strategic bias had to be separated from sensitivity, which could be done
by manipulating bias via an external payoff. Sperling & Dosher (1986) had the insight
that cognitive psychologists could and should generalize the techniques from SDT to other
tasks, such as choice reaction-time tasks, to differentiate the effects of interest from the
strategic bias of the participants.
One common strategic decision for participants in cognitive psychology experiments
is where to settle along the speed-accuracy tradeoff. The difference between settling for
95% accuracy and 100% may result in a quite significant difference in reaction-time (RT)
results. Pachella (1974) gives examples where researchers found a significant effect when
they examined RT differences and discussed the exciting implications of this result, but
when accuracy differences were also considered, the effect disappeared. This example
demonstrates it is impossible for experimenters to properly interpret their results if they do
not also consider the strategy of their participants.
The Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff can also have a profound effect in experiments beyond
just the speed and accuracy for a given task. For example, in Psychological Refractory-
Period (PRP) tasks (Welford, 1952; Pashler, 1994), a participant is given two tasks to per-
form on a given trial, separated by a short time known as the Stimulus-Onset Asynchrony
(SOA). Participants have to respond to the first task before they respond to the second task.
Within each task there is going to be a SAT point, such that faster performance on that task
will result in lower accuracy, but there is also a SAT point in the difference between the first
and second response, in that as a participant minimizes this difference she is more likely to
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make the second response before the first one. The difference in time between the first and
second response is known as the Inter-Response Interval (IRI). If a participant responds to
Task 2 before they respond to Task 1, then they have made a mistake on that trial. Meyer
et al. (1995) pointed out that instructions for the PRP task usually told participants to priori-
tize Task 1 over Task 2, and thus avoid making response-reversal errors1. These instructions
strongly encourage participants to set a SAT point such that their accuracy for their IRI is
very high, at the result of a time cost in doing Task 2. The realization that instructions were
influencing participant’s behavior, but not necessarily any structural cognitive limitation,
prompted Meyer et al. to form a class of Adaptive Executive-Control (AEC) models that
could be strategically varied. One such model, the Strategic Response-Deferment (SRD;
see also Meyer & Kieras, 1997a) fit data from a variety of PRP experiments better than
standard models that presupposed an immutable Response-Selection Bottleneck (RSB).
Schumacher et al. (1999) found further evidence supporting the SRD model over a RSB
model, when they found that across sessions participants first adopted a “cautious” strat-
egy that resulted in very few response-reversal errors, but in later sessions adopted a more
“daring” strategy that resulted in faster performance on Task 2 but at the cost of more
response-reversal errors.
Howes, Lewis, and Vera (unpublished manuscript) expanded on these response-reversal
errors in PRP tasks in their Variance-Bounded Response (VBR) theory of ordered re-
sponses. Their theory expands on the “daring” strategy discussed above, as they predict
the IRI to be just enough time to separate the distributions of the RTs for Task 1 and for
Task 2, given a utility function and certain architectural constraints, such as a measure of
an individual’s internal motor noise and modality-specific response preparation times. In
other words, given the external payoff and estimates of internal motor noise, they are able
to predict precisely what mean IRI an individual in the PRP task would set. The differ-
ence between cautious and daring strategies would thus be explained by differences in the
1Response-reversal errors are any trial where the response for Task 2 comes before Task 1, or, equivalently,
where the IRI < 0.
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perceived penalty for making response-reversal errors: early in the experiments individuals
adopt a utility function such that the cost of errors is considerably greater than the actual
cost due to the payoff, later in the experiment participants adopt a utility function which re-
duces the cost of such errors and hence result in a smaller IRI. Thus may strategic concerns
guided by architectural limitations determine what the mean IRI is for an individual.
We thus see that strategic considerations are needed to answer fundamental questions
in cognitive psychology. If we want to understand what constraints there are in the mind,
and progress in understanding cognition, we have to follow the precedent of SDT and
dissociate strategic choices from immutable cognitive limitations. Probably the most ef-
fective way to separate strategy from actual cognitive constraints is via cognitive modeling
(Newell, 1973, 1990; Meyer & Kieras, 1999), because this allows one to test different
strategies given certain architectural assumptions. The problem, of course, is that it is al-
ways possible to argue about the architectural assumptions, as the debate over whether or
not a RSB exists shows (Pashler, 1994; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a), and the fact that differ-
ent cognitive architectures all make some different assumptions, such as ACT-R (Anderson
et al., 2005), SOAR (Laird & Rosenbloom, 1996), and EPIC (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a). To
allow researchers to control for a number of architectural assumptions, Howes et al. (un-
published manuscript) used cognitively-bounded rational analysis via constraint-based op-
timizing reasoning engine (CORE) to help separate architectural assumptions from strate-
gic choices (Howes et al., 2007; Vera et al., 2004) by allowing one to generate models that
formally specify architectural constraints and strategy spaces.
In this dissertation, we expand on the previous research into strategies. In Chap-
ter 2 we expand the VBR model, by designing experiments to test if people do adapt
mathematically-optimal to an external payoff and their internal motor noise, and by gener-
alizing it so that it does not just apply to the IRI in PRP tasks. By explicitly testing how
individuals adapt to the payoff, we hope to narrow the strategy space of possible strategies
people choose in cognitive psychology experiments. This also allows us not only to es-
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tablish what participants in an experiment are adapting to maximize, but also to evaluate
how well the participants have performed. In Chapter 2, we used a simple-RT experi-
ment that allowed for a large range of strategic variation. We awarded points based on
performance, to indicate to participants how they should perform. This also allowed us
to compare human performance to the mathematically-optimal strategy that would have
maximized points. We used two different payoffs, one emphasizing “speed” and another
emphasizing “accuracy.” We found that participants adapted to these payoffs, and that if
there was a low enough level of random variation in the payoffs (i.e. internal motor noise
plus external experimentally-controlled noise), participants adapted near-optimally to these
payoffs.
After Chapter 2 established that participants were trying to maximize their points in a
typical experiment, we then studied strategic performance in more complicated tasks. In
Chapter 3, we used a task-interruption procedure, whereby people had to do two different
tasks, but had to finish a task that starts later in time before they had finished a task that
began earlier in time. For example, if Task 1 began at time 0, and Task 2 began at time 100,
then Task 2 had to be completed before Task 1. This is the opposite of the standard PRP
procedure, so it could be considered an “Anti-PRP” procedure.
This “Anti-PRP” procedure is complicated enough that there are many different strate-
gies a person could adopt to perform under it, depending in part on cognitive limitations.
For example, if a person is trying to do Task 1 as quickly as possible, such that as soon
as she chooses a response she immediately begins making it, this may constrain how the
task could be interrupted by Task 2. This way of performing, known as “immediate mode”
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997a) can be contrasted with another way known as “deferred mode”
whereby the response for Task 1 would first enter working-memory, only being further sent
to the motor system after some control signal indicating processing of the response was
allowed to proceed. We found some evidence indicating that the response mode used by a
person did affect how she interrupted a task.
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In order to further examine what strategies people employed to deal with task inter-
ruptions, for one of the experiments in Chapter 3, we modeled our results using CORE2
(Howes et al., unpublished manuscript). We found evidence consistent with the Strategic
Response Deferment theory of Meyer et al. (1995), such that participants initially locked up
their motor processor for Task 1, and only unlocked it when given a go signal after certain
stages in Task 2.
Once we have established in Chapter 3 some of the variety of strategies that could be
used in a multitasking experiment, Chapter 4 began to characterize what factors encourage
an individual to favor one strategy over another. We know from previous literature there
are a variety of different strategies different individuals select to multi-task (Schumacher
et al., 1999, 2001; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Dickman & Meyer, 1988). Are there any sys-
tematic differences that would lead us to predict a given individual would favor a particular
strategy? In Chapter 4 we look at one such factor: the culture a person is raised in. Masuda
& Nisbett (2001) found evidence that individuals from a collectivist society such as Japan
tended to have more holistic attentional strategies which encouraged these individuals to
process multiple objects simultaneously. However, they found individuals from individu-
alistic societies such as America tended to have more analytic attentional strategies which
encouraged these individuals to primarily focus on the focal object and then switch their
attention to other objects when needed. Although Masuda & Nisbett did not test individ-
uals in a multitasking context, holistic and analytic attentional strategies could also affect
the strategies people choose to use when multitasking. Holistic attention would be con-
sistent with a preference toward parallel strategies where multiple objects would be pro-
cessed simultaneously. Analytic attention would favor switching between tasks. Indeed,
we found evidence that in time-sharing tasks where people have to do two tasks simul-
taneously, Americans tended to choose a sequential strategy, while Japanese were more
likely to choose a parallel strategy. Further, in a task-switching study, we found evidence
2For more details on how CORE modeling works, see Chapter 3
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that Japanese were more likely to choose a parallel strategy whereby they had no costs,
whereas Americans preferred sequential strategies, which they performed better than did
Japanese who used those same strategies.
Chapter 5 is a brief chapter that took our findings from Chapter 4 about cultural differ-
ences in choosing a strategy, and applied that finding to the results from Chapter 2 about
how people adapt to different payoff schemes. Because the experiments in Chapter 2 had
tightly constrained strategy spaces, we did not think culture should affect the results there.
As predicted, we found little evidence that culture had any effect on strategies under those
conditions.
Combining our results from Chapters 4 and 5, we found that in tasks where different
attentional strategies may be employed by participants, the culture of participants needs
to be controlled for in order to ascertain meaningful results. However, in tasks where
attentional strategies are constrained so that participants will all choose the same strategy,
then cultural differences will not affect the results so participants from different cultures
can safely be aggregated.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Adaptations in Ordered
Responses
2.1 Introduction
Many of our everyday tasks require extremely precise coordination of ordered motor ac-
tions, all performed in less than a second. For example, every time we type, we coordinate
our key presses across multiple fingers and across our hands. People who know how to
touch-type and want to type as quickly as possible, soon become aware of a speed-accuracy
tradeoff in their typing: the faster they type, the sooner they finish, but the more mistakes
they make, and these errors take time to correct. Maybe it would have been faster overall if
they had typed slower and made fewer errors. Or maybe they should have typed quicker and
made more errors, but they still would have finished typing and making their corrections
sooner. Another example is a pianist playing “Flight of the Bumblebee” who may want to
play it faster, but has to worry about making errors and taking away from the quality of the
piece. What strategies are used in coordinating responses in tasks that require at least two
motor responses, and how close do people get to performing these tasks optimally?
A crucial component in performing these tasks is the time between the first and second
responses, known as the inter-response interval (IRI). For many tasks, the total amount of
time to do the task could be minimized by minimizing this IRI. However, due to noise in
the motor system (Meyer et al., 1988), if the average IRI is too small, this would result
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in too many mistakes whereby the second response is made before the first response. If
the average IRI is too large, although mistakes would be rare, the task would be done
inefficiently as it could be finished earlier. So finding the optimal mean IRI to choose for a
task is an interesting problem in decision-making, because optimal IRI has to combine both
the speed in doing the task with accuracy in performing it to result in optimal behavior.
The study of optimality and optimal behavior dates back to signal-detection theory
(SDT) in the 1950’s (Green & Swets, 1966; Sperling & Dosher, 1986), which examined
how a person’s strategy should adapt to their payoff, regardless of their sensitivity to the
stimuli in the actual task. There has been plenty of research within the perceptual do-
main comparing human perception to an “ideal observer.” An ideal observer is a model of
optimal performance on a given task, given known structural constraints. Ideal observer
models have been used in vision research (e.g. Geisler, 1989; Knill, 1998), auditory per-
ception (see Macmillan & Creelman, 2005, for a good overview), and even cognitive tasks
such as classification tasks (Edwards & Metz, 2006). The general finding is that human
observers differ from ideal observer models.
Sperling and Dosher (1986) discussed generalizing the findings of SDT to various
other non-perceptual tasks, including choice-reaction time experiments and speed-accuracy
tradeoffs. By showing that these other tasks are isomorphic to signal-detection tasks, we
can apply their logic to other problems to discern optimal behavior. Because we are in-
terested in a speed-accuracy tradeoff here, we will discuss below in more detail how the
signal-detection approach applies to our experiments.
In our experiments, we are interested in the speed and accuracy of successive responses
separated by an IRI. To determine how accurately participants determined their mean IRI,
we examined the distribution of IRIs to assess what mean would maximize points. Al-
though it is well-known that reaction-time distributions tend to follow a Gamma distribu-
tion (Luce, 1986), or a log-normal distribution, we only need an approximate distribution.
Hence we used a Gaussian distribution as a convenient approximation.
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If participants know the external payoff, as they do in our Experiment 1, they can use
this as the basis of their utility payoff. For example, in the Accuracy-Payoff condition,
participants earn 100 - RT/5 points if correct, and - 100 points if incorrect. Participants
have to estimate what mean IRI they should use and what their level of internal motor
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Although this equation could be solved for a maximum, this is insufficient for our purposes,
because there is no way to compute the variance of this optimal mean IRI. If, say, the
participant chooses a mean IRI 10 msec off from optimal, would this result in a discernible
difference in points earned? As Roberts and Pashler (2000) pointed out, it is not sufficient
merely to fit the data; the confidence interval also has to be considered, i.e. the range of the
prediction. This equation does not tell us how big a difference there is if a person is a few
msec too slow or too fast. Hence we need to consider the confidence interval around the
optimal IRI, in order to judge both the quality of our model and the closeness of our fit.
A better approach to analyze optimal performance on tasks is to compare human per-
formance with mathematically optimal performance generated from Monte-Carlo models.
Maloney, Trommershäuser, and Landy (2007) use this approach to understand performance
on a timed pointing task. In their task, people had 700 msec to touch a computer screen
within a particular circle, but would be penalized if they touched within a different circle
that overlapped their desired circle, or would be both penalized and rewarded if they re-
sponded within the overlap. Participants were given a payoff function to motivate them,
with more points earned in the task equal to more money earned in the experiment. The
payoff was manipulated within-subject, such that a penalty (responding in the wrong circle)
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would be 0, 100 or 500 points off; a correct response (responding within the proper circle)
always earned 100 points.
Maloney et al. (2007) were then able to examine whether participants adapted to the
payoff and to what extent they adapted. They found that participants clearly adapted, in
that when the penalty was increased, participants made fewer errors where they responded
within the wrong circle and more errors where they responded outside of both circles (for
which they were not penalized). When the penalty was 0, however, participants almost al-
ways responded within the proper circle, even if that meant making more errors by pressing
the screen where the two circles overlapped.
In order to assess how well participants adapted, Maloney et al. realized they needed
a proxy to measure the participant’s motor noise level. To do so, they averaged all of each
participant’s endpoints and used their average point as the goal each participant was aim-
ing for. Given this point, they then measured to what degree participants differed from this
point, and they found this followed a normal distribution, with a mean along each coor-
dinate that was the average point, and a different standard deviation for each participant,
σ. This standard deviation was then used as a measure of each participant’s internal motor
noise level. Given the objective payoff function and a person’s motor-noise level, Monte
Carlo simulations were then run to find the optimal point to aim for given those conditions.
Participants could then be compared to these simulations to examine how close the point
they aimed for was to the optimal point. They found that all but one participant did not
significantly differ from optimal.
A similar line of research into optimality was conducted by Meyer et al. (1988), who
focused their attention on Fitts’ Law, which determines the time taken to reach something
as a function of its distance and size. They found that a form of Fitts’ Law may be derived
from assuming the motor control system adapts optimally to its own noise.
Recently, Howes et al. (in press) posited a Variance-Bounded Response (VBR) theory
for ordered responses. This theory posits that given cognitive and motor constraints, and
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an individual’s expected utility function, the IRI will be the duration that maximizes the
payoff. If we use the actual objective payoff function as a proxy for the individual’s ex-
pected utiltity function, we are able to test this zero-parameter theory in our experiments
by comparing its predictions versus human behaviors.
Previous research also considered what constraints there are in a choice RT task with
two key presses. One such constraint may be the goal of going as fast as possible, the
soft-constraints hypothesis (Gray et al., 2006), which states that we try to use interactive
routines that minimize the time it takes to complete the task, while achieving expected
benefits. However, there are two important caveats in applying this hypothesis to a lot of
tasks that focus on IRI. For one thing, the hypothesis does not clearly state how it combines
its goal of minimizing reaction time with the risk of decreased accuracy. Another important
caveat is that this hypothesis does not apply to tasks that take less than one-third of a second.
In fact, it is not clear from this hypothesis that people can adapt to tasks that take less than
333 milliseconds to finish. So if there is a sub-task that takes this long but people cannot
adapt to it, this may explain why people under this hypothesis do not perform optimally.
Another concern is that because IRI tasks have a very short RT, it is unclear whether
participants would even be able to adapt for times so small. It is possible that the IRI could
not average less than 50 msec. This result would be expected from a straightforward analy-
sis of production rules used in cognitive architectures, which tend to have a 50 msec firing
rate. This is the firing rate of production rules in many cognitive architectures, including
ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2005), SOAR (Laird & Rosenbloom, 1996), and EPIC (Meyer &
Kieras, 1997a). However, a participant could adopt a clever work-around to this structural
limitation, if she was so inclined. Instead of trying to program two motor responses which
would be separated by at least 50 msec, she could try to make one motor response, such as
press down with both hands simultaneously. So long as one hand began at a slightly higher
point than the other, then this one response could generate any mean IRI, depending on the
height of this difference.
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Inter-response interval is important to examine not just for its real-world use, but be-
cause it comes up in many complicated tasks within experimental psychology. For exam-
ple, in Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) studies (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a,b), a person
is given two tasks, A and B, where Task A is presented first and has to be completed first.
Task B is presented following a stimulus onset-asynchrony (SOA) some time after Task
A is first presented. After a participant responds to Task A, then they have to respond
to Task B. Because participants who respond to Task B before Task A will be penalized
for responding in the wrong order, it is very important for participants to consider how to
schedule their responses to the two tasks such that Task A is completed first. We hypothe-
size that participants will schedule their responses as a function of the external payoff and
their internal motor noise, although of course participants may internalize the payoff so that
it doesn’t perfectly correspond to the external payoff.
The IRI for the participant is of crucial theoretical importance in cases with a short
SOA. If the penalty for responding to Task B before Task A is severe enough, or the reward
for responding quickly to Task B is too small, a participant may choose to have a large
IRI to minimize the possibility of making an order-error. This large IRI may even help
explain the PRP effect (Pashler, 1994; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a), whereby Task B has a
larger reaction time when the SOA is small than when the SOA is large. If IRI is controlled
strategically, then to understand performance on any task that has two responses we need to
consider how the participants are deciding what their mean IRI should be. Figure 2.1 shows
a hypothetical example of two distributions, where the solid distribution corresponds to the
RTs associated with Task A, and the dotted distribution corresponds to the RTs associated
with Task B. The difference in means for each distribution is the mean IRI, here about
25 msec. The filled area corresponds to those times where the person responds to Task B
before responding to Task A, i.e. makes a response-reversal or order-error. As mean IRI
increased, the filled area will decrease, and the participant will make fewer errors.
In this dissertation we will present three experiments, all of which focus on analyz-
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IRI
Figure 2.1. Idealized distributions for RT1 and RT2 in a task; filled region represents error.
ing inter-response intervals in ways similar to how Maloney et al. (2007) analyzed timed
pointing tasks. Our experiments were designed to be as basic as possible, using a simple
reaction-time (RT) task that only requires two key presses. The standard deviation of the
IRI of these two key presses could be considered a measure of internal motor noise, once
the participant had stabilized her strategy. We also had a payoff function during the exper-
iment that translated into more money if participants earned more points, based on their
performance. Although we did not make participants explicitly aware of the details of the
payoff function, they were provided with enough feedback about their performance that
they could learn the payoff function and earn the maximum number of points.
The previous research on optimality focused on people adapting to internal noise, but
not an external, experimentally-controlled noise. Signal-detection theory did initially focus
on how people respond to Signal compared to Signal and Noise, but the task was not really
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to optimally adapt to noise but to detect the signal. It is quite possible that people are
better able to adapt to internal noise than to external noise. With internal noise people
may, unconsciously, have more information about the distribution of noise and so be better
able to adapt. This internal noise may also be small, and people may only be able to
adapt to small amounts of noise. However, by experimentally adding a random number to
participants results that affects their performance, participants would have to learn to adapt
not just to their internal noise but to this external noise.
In Experiment 1, we had a between-subject design that included three payoff conditions
that were based on total reaction time from when a participant began until the second key
press was made. After running a few participants, we realized the behavioral data was not
what we expected. We then closely examined our payoff function itself, and discovered
that optimal performance given our payoff functions was not differentiable across payoffs.
We include this experiment here mostly as a warning of how crucial it is to derive the right
payoff to get participants to perform in a meaningful way.
Experiment 2 had two payoffs, based solely on IRI and not total reaction time. These
payoffs were first tested using Monte Carlo simulations to ensure that optimal performance
was differentiable. Another change from Experiment 1 was we added external noise at dif-
ferent levels (a high and a low-level). We were interested to see if participants would adapt
not just to internal motor noise but to external, experimentally controlled noise. We found
that participants clearly adapted to their payoff, and adapted near-optimally when given
little external noise. Participants in the external high-noise group, however, did not adapt
particularly closely to optimal. Experiment 3 was basically a replication of Experiment
2, but with different levels of external noise (either no-noise or medium-noise). Here we
found adaptation close to optimal in all four conditions. Participants adapted to the payoff,
even when their mean IRI was only 15 msec.
In our Experiments 2 and 3, for the external-noise condition, we add a random num-
ber to a participant’s IRI, drawn from a random, independent Gaussian distribution with
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mean 0, but with a different standard deviation depending on the condition. Our payoff is
more complicated than in Experiment 1, and participants are not explicitly told the payoff.
However, if we assume that IRI is normally distributed, then the equation that participants











) , where σEnoise is the standard deviation of
the external noise. Naturally this is a more complicated distribution to adapt to, as there are
two parameters the participant must adapt to.
2.2 Experiment 1
2.2.1 Method
Participants. Nine undergraduate students from the University of Michigan were run in
return for monetary compensation. Participants received an $8 base payment, along with a
bonus depending on performance (see below for details).
Apparatus. Data collection was controlled by a computer with a WINDOWS™ oper-
ating system and E-Prime software. Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch Sony Trinitron
video display, and responses were recorded via a customized manual-response panel with
finger keys for each hand. The video display was located 80 cm from the participants, who
sat at a table with their heads on a chin rest in a quiet lab room.
Experimental Design and Procedure. Each participant was run for 1440 trials, divided
into 12 blocks, each with 120 trials. Each block required a different set of key presses, but
the key press was the same for every trial in a given block. Participants did not know which
key press they would have to do until the first trial of a block, but they were informed that
every trial would require the same key presses in a given block.
The task was a simple reaction-time experiment, in which on every trial as soon as
they saw the word “GO!” on screen, participants had to press two of their finger keys in
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a particular order. Only the right-middle, right-index, left-index, and left-middle fingers
were used. To allow the possibility of pressing the keys in the wrong order and thus make
an order error, the combination involving the same finger pressed twice was not used. All
twelve possible combinations of two key presses were performed. For example, in Block 1
on every trial participants may have had to first press their right-middle finger and then their
left-middle finger. Block 2 may have required them to press their right-index finger and









Figure 2.2. Timeline for a typical trial in Experiment 1.
We used a between-subject design, manipulating payoff across participants. All partici-
pants were told that their goal was to earn as many points as possible. They were also given
monetary reward depending on the number of points they earned, so that the more points
they earned, the more money they earned. Participants earned points the same way across
conditions: on every trial, a participant began with 100 trial points, and then lost a point
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for every 5 msec it took to respond. So if a participant correctly responded in 200 msec,
they would earn 100 - 200/5 = 60 points on that trial. The three payoffs differed in how
errors were treated. In the accuracy condition, participants lost 100 points if they made an
error on a trial. In the speed condition, participants lost 0 points if they made an error on a
trial. In the tradeoff condition, participants lost their Reaction-Time/5 points if they made
an error on that trial, so that participants lost more points if they took longer to respond and
made an error
Between blocks, participants were allowed to rest as long as they wanted. When they
were ready, the experimenter pressed a key to begin the block. On screen, each participant
saw four finger keys that resembled the finger keys in front of the participant. A “1” ap-
peared above one of the keys on screen, and a “2” appeared above another. Participants had
to press the keys in front of them in the order that they appeared on screen, i.e. press the
“1” key first and the “2” key second.
These instruction keys appeared on screen for 1000 msec (for the first 10 trials of each
block), then were replaced by a fixation that appeared in the center of the screen. After the
fixation was there for 700 msec, it disappeared and that same location was filled with the
word “GO!” and participants could respond. Participants who responded before the word
“GO!” appeared on screen got feedback with an “Early Error” and received 0 points for
that trial in all payoff conditions.
Participants were given feedback after every trial, telling them how many points they
earned on that trial, and how many points they had earned for that block so far. They
also saw a visual image of the keys that corresponded to the type of error they made. If
participants responded correctly, they saw the instruction keys.
At the end of a block, participants were told their average reaction time on the previous
block, their average points per trial, and their total points.
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Data Analysis. We examined each participant’s mean IRI and mean RT. We then also
ran Monte Carlo simulations to compare each participant’s performance versus optimal
performance given her standard deviation of reaction time. Although it did not change our
results, we also removed any outliers that were more than three standard deviations away
from the mean.
2.2.2 Results
In examining overall main effects, we only used data from the second half of the experiment
(Block 7 on) because by then performance across blocks had stabilized and participants
seemingly settled upon a strategy. However, because each block had a unique key press,
and we had to use data from all second-half blocks for these analyses, we aggregated over
individual types of key presses.
Payoff Total RT (msec) IRI (msec) sd.IRI (msec) Accuracy (%)
Speed 124 37.24 22.43 95.67
Accuracy 143 46.38 24.24 97.67
Middle 165 47.34 27.82 98.33
Table 2.1. Comparison of mean RTs across payoffs.
Given we ran only nine subjects across three conditions, we did not find any significant
effect of payoff on Total RT (F(2,8) < 1, ns) or on IRI (F(2,8) < 1). The fact that IRI did
not reliably differ across payoffs indicated we were unlikely to find any tradeoffs, although
there was a slight trend in the direction we predicted. We also examined accuracy (by doing
an arc-sin transform) and again found no difference, F(2,8) < 1, ns. Table 2.1 presents the
mean scores for the three participants in each payoff condition.
Because the trend in our results did not conform to what was expected, we made for-
mal mathematical models using Monte Carlo simulations to compare our data to predicted
results. In these models, we programmed the actual external payoff, and used each partic-
ipant’s standard deviation of IRI as the basis of internal motor noise. Hence a participant
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Optimal IRI as a function of SD of IRI












Figure 2.3. Optimal mean IRI as a function of standard deviation of IRI; the solid dot is
one participant’s observed mean IRI and s.d. of IRI.
with more internal motor noise should have a larger IRI than a participant in the same
payoff condition with less motor noise.
Figure 2.3 shows a plot of optimal IRI as a function of the standard deviation of IRI.
This plot was generated via Monte Carlo simulations, where 500 points were randomly
generated from a Normal Distribution with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 50,
corresponding to taking 100 msec to make the first key press and a standard deviation of
that first key press of 50 msec (a reasonable approximation to the human data). These
points were added to 500 points generated from another Normal Distribution used to rep-
resent the IRI, with mean 44 and standard deviation 25 (estimated from the human data).
We find that the optimal IRI is very similar for the middle and accuracy-payoffs, regardless
of internal noise level. As can clearly be seen, the optimal IRI for accuracy falls within the
95% confidence interval for the middle-payoff. The optimal IRI for the Speed Payoff also
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Expected payoff as function of IRI at SD=25













Figure 2.4. Expected payoff as a function of IRI: Middle and Accuracy Payoff.
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fell within the 95% confidence interval. The large dot in the figure is a typical participant’s
observed mean IRI and s.d. of IRI. Because this participant’s results fall within the con-
fidence interval of optimal performance for different payoffs, the different payoffs did not
sufficiently separate different optimal performance.
In Figure 2.4 we next examined the degree that our payoffs were separated. From Table
2.1 we can see that mean IRI of participants in the accuracy and middle-payoff conditions
are virtually identical, so for ease of readability we plotted the expected payoffs for those
two conditions. We plotted this again via Monte Carlo simulation, assuming that RT1
comes from a Normal Distribution with mean of 100 and standard deviation of 50. We then
generated 500 points from that distribution, and assumed IRI comes from a normal distri-
bution with an unknown mean and a standard deviation of 24 msec (which we estimated
from the data). We then generated 500 points at each different mean IRI, and calculated
how many points participants would earn on average per trial. This allowed us to figure
out expected payoff as a function of mean IRI, across different payoffs. From Figure 2.4
it is apparent that after an IRI of about 20 msec, there is not sufficient separation between
the two payoffs. In fact, the expected payoff for accuracy falls within the 95% confidence
interval of the payoff for the middle-payoff condition.
2.2.3 Discussion
Although Experiment 1 did not work out as we originally planned, it was illuminating in
that it allowed us to learn from our mistakes. We initially did not fully consider some of the
issues involved in a payoff scheme, such as examining separation of different payoffs before
running participants. Without doing so, even if participants did perform optimally, we may
not be able to differentiate their adaptations to different payoffs, and so may incorrectly
conclude participants did not adapt properly.
Another problem with our payoff scheme was that it allowed for a larger range of strate-
gies than we expected. For example, some participants tried to anticipate the “go” signal
22
and so made more early errors than other participants who waited until they perceived the
signal. Our models that factored in what would be the optimal time for RT1 and an optimal
IRI quickly got so complicated that we realized we needed to simplify our experiment to
get better data.
2.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 did not have a sufficiently precise payoff scheme to differentiate optimal per-
formance in adapting to those payoff schemes, so participants did not adapt the way we
expected, due perhaps to there being too many strategies that would result in optimal or
near-optimal performance. In order to better constrain the number of possible strategies
participants should choose for optimal performance, the strategy space, we made the pay-
off based solely on the IRI instead of total RT. Finally, we were worried that participants
would not adapt optimally because they initially learned a sub-optimal strategy and decided
it was an acceptably good strategy. To deal with this issue, we had practice blocks through
the session allowing participants to try new strategies with no consequences, and the ex-
perimenter encouraged participants to do so. In Experiment 1, we had used all possible
combinations of two key presses because we expected that the amount of motor noise for
some of these combinations would be greater than for other combinations of key presses, so
we had wanted to see a participant adapt to different levels of noise. However, there was no
systematic difference in motor-noise level across these different combination key-presses,
so we collapsed these different key presses into just one combination that participants do
throughout the session.
2.3.1 Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduate students from the University of Michigan were
run in return for monetary compensation. No participant was also in Experiment 1. Par-
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ticipants received an $8 base payment, along with a bonus depending on performance (see
below for details). Participants were aware of how points translated into extra money.
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1.
Experimental Design. Each participant was run for 1080 trials, divided into 18 blocks,
each with 60 trials. These 18 blocks were organized into 6 superblocks made up of 3
blocks each, with the first block being a practice block where points did not count, and
the next two being real blocks where points did count. So, in total, there were six practice
blocks interspersed throughout the session, and twelve test blocks. Participants were told
beforehand whether the block was practice or not, and given oral encouragement from the










Figure 2.5. Timeline for a typical trial in Experiment 2.
The task, as in Experiment 1, was a simple reaction-time task. On every trial as soon as
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Figure 2.6. Optimal mean IRI as a function of standard deviation of IRI.
they saw the word “GO!” on screen, participants had to first press their right middle finger
and then press their left index finger. Participants were informed in written instructions and
by the experimenter that performance was based solely on the time and accuracy between
their first and second key press. Hence, as in Figure 2.5, Total RT and IRI are the exact
same, as the time before the key press does not affect the points earned.
We used a 2x2 between-subject design, manipulating payoff and external noise across
participants, and there were 6 participants in each condition. All participants were given
the same instructions and told that their goal was to earn as many points as possible, along
with a monetary reward depending on how many points they earned.
Payoff: We used two payoff schemes, which we refer to as a Speed and Accuracy
Payoff.
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Speed payoff: Points(IRI) =

(100− IRI/5)4/1000000 0 ≤ IRI < 25
(100− IRI/5)2/1000 IRI ≥ 25
0 IRI < 0
(2.1)
In words, the Speed Payoff was a step function such that participants averaged around
80 points if their IRI was less than 25 msec, and they averaged around 8 points if their IRI
was greater than 25 msec. If they made a response-reversal error, they received 0 points.
We used a step function because this meant a steep drop in points if participants took longer
than the deadline between responses.
Accuracy payoff: Points(IRI) =

(200− IRI/10) IRI ≥ 0
−600 IRI < 0
(2.2)
In words, the Accuracy Payoff was a linear function with a steep punishment for a
response-reversal error. We used a linear function because this meant that participants only
lost one point for every 10 msec of IRI, so they were not heavily punished for taking a little
longer between responses.
External Noise: In order for us to manipulate noise levels to see how well participants
can adapt to different amounts of noise, we added a random number to participants’ ob-
served IRI, generated from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and a pre-determined stan-
dard deviation depending on whether participants were in the high or low-noise condition.
Participants received feedback and points based on this adapted, noisy IRI. For example,
if a participant correctly responded with an IRI of 25 msec, then we would take that 25
and add a random number generated from a Gaussian distribution. The new sum would
be used for feedback and points purposes. In the low-noise condition, the random number
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was generated from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 10. In the
high-noise condition, the random number was generated from a Gaussian distribution with
mean 0 and standard deviation 60. All participants knew that there might be some external
noise, but participants did not know how the noise was generated or which condition they
were in.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that on every trial,
participants had to first press their right middle finger and then their left index finger. Also,
participants first had one block of 60 trials that was practice, so that the points did not count
toward their final total. This was followed by two blocks each of 60 trials where the points
counted, then another practice block, then two real blocks, etc.
All participants were given the same instructions, and were never told what condition
they were in. Before every practice block (except the first one), participants were encour-
aged to try different strategies. The experimenter told participants they could try shorter or
longer IRIs to see if their averaged points increased or not. The experimenter never told
participants the details of the payoff function.
Feedback was the same as in Experiment 1, except that at the end of a block, participants
were told their average IRI (not their average total RT) on the previous block, their average
points per trial, and their total points.
2.3.2 Results
For all results, we only used the final 6 test blocks of data. This way participants not only
had time to get used to the task, but had four practice blocks to settle on a strategy they liked.
This was important for data analyses, because if participants were changing strategies, this
would result in a seemingly large standard deviation of IRI, which is our proxy statistic for
internal motor noise. We also removed any trials where the Inter-Response Interval (IRI)
was more than 3 standard deviations away from the mean IRI. These trials were less than
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20 14.88 88.17 78.67
Overall 58 17.60 96.75 88.88
Table 2.2. Comparison of mean IRIs across payoffs.
The overall omnibus F-test revealed a significant difference in IRIs across our four
groups, F(3, 20) = 25.96, p < .001. We then computed contrasts across all four groups
and found that the mean IRI for all participants in the Accuracy Payoff, 75.47 msec, was
significantly greater than the mean IRI for participants in the Speed Payoff, 41.31 msec,
t(20) = 4.778, p < .001. The fact that accuracy-payoff IRI was longer than in the speed-
payoff IRI was as we predicted. See Table 2.2 for each group’s mean IRI.
We also computed a contrast to examine whether participants adapted to the level of
external noise. We found that the mean IRI of the high-noise participants was 84.49 msec,
significantly larger than that for the low-noise participants, 32.29 msec, t(20) = 7.30, p <
.001. For participants in both the speed and accuracy payoffs, we also computed contrasts
showing that high-noise participants differed from low-noise participants, for speed t(20) =
4.22, p < .001, and for accuracy t(20) = 6.104, p < .001.
We also computed contrasts that compared accuracy-payoff low-noise participants with
speed-payoff low-noise participants, to make sure that when controlling for external noise,
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we still found differences in payoffs. For high-noise, we found that accuracy mean IRI was
significantly greater than speed mean IRI, t(20) = 4.32, p < .001, and for low-noise, we
also found this difference, although not as strongly t(20) = 2.44, p < .05.
We also tested whether error rate differed across conditions, by doing an arcsin trans-
formation of the square root of the accuracy percentage. We first analyzed those errors that
were caused only by internal noise, i.e. those cases where the keys were actually pressed
in the wrong order. Not surprisingly, we found that the accuracy-payoff participants were
more accurate than the speed-payoff participants, t(20) = 12.46, p < .001. However, we
did not find a difference in the high-noise participants (88.92%) compared to the low-noise
participants (88.83%), t(20) = -.921, ns. Nor was the accuracy different for participants in
the Speed Payoff at the different noise levels.
We also examined accuracy after factoring in external noise, i.e. cases where the feed-
back told the participant he made an error, regardless of whether the participant actually
pressed the keys in the wrong order or not. Once again, we found that accuracy participants
(97.08%) were more accurate than speed participants (80.67%), t(20) = 9.414, p < .001.
We calculated optimal IRI for each participant. To calculate optimal IRI, we generated
500 points from a Normal Distribution with mean 1 and a standard deviation that was
the same as each participant’s standard deviation of IRI. To factor in the external noise,
we added to this distribution 500 points generated from another Normal Distribution with
mean 0 and standard deviation of 10 or 60, depending on the condition that each participant
was in. Summing these distribution gave us a distribution of IRIs, and we could then use
our external payoff to figure out how many points on average the model would earn with
that distribution of IRIs. We then repeated this process by using 500 points generated from
a Normal Distribution with mean 2, then a Normal Distribution with mean 3, etc. up to
about mean 200. Whichever mean resulted in the most points on average was considered
“optimal.”
Along with finding the differences we predicted in mean IRI, we again computed Opti-
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Figure 2.7. Relative difference from optimal IRI by condition.
30
Acc High Noise Acc Low Noise Spd High Noise Spd Low Noise















Figure 2.8. Absolute difference from optimal IRI by condition.
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mal IRI via Monte-Carlo models, because we have a well-defined payoff function that we
can use to compute optimal IRI, we have a proxy measure of a participant’s internal noise
(their standard deviation of IRI), and we know their external noise. Figure 2.7 has a barplot
averaged over participants in each group showing how much each group differs from op-
timal. We can see that participants in the low-noise condition were closer to optimal than
participants in the high-noise condition. Also, we see the effect of payoff. Accuracy-payoff
participants tended to be too fast compared to optimal, whereas speed participants tended
to be too slow (especially in the high-noise group).
2.3.3 Discussion
We found that participants did adapt to the payoff, as we expected, and that adding external
noise had an effect on performance. There were two major drawbacks in Experiment 2,
though. For one thing, it is unclear how total noise level affected how well participants
could find an optimal strategy. At 60 msec of external noise, participants could not find an
optimal IRI, at 10 msec they came close. It is unclear if total noise works like a staircase
function, whereby below a certain level of noise people can find optimal or near-optimal
mean IRI, or it works more like a monotonic function, whereby as the level of total noise
increases the difference from optimality also increases. In order to help elucidate this, we
need to test people at a level of noise in-between the two extremes we have.
The other drawback is that even our low-noise condition includes some external noise.
Although participants in this condition did adapt quite well, they significantly differed from
optimality in the accuracy-payoff condition. It is possible that giving no external noise
would allow participants to adapt perfectly. People have had countless hours to get used
to their own level of internal motor noise, so may be able to adapt extraordinarily well to
that. But most people have very little experience dealing with external noise, so are not as
adroit at adapting to that. Further, most cognitive experiments do not require participants
to adapt to any sort of external noise, only their own cognitive, perceptual and motor pro-
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cesses. Hence we thought it important to establish how well participants could adapt in a
no-external noise condition, as this most closely mirrors both their own experiences and
how well they could perform in typical experiments.
2.4 Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we replicated our results in Experiment 2, but with different levels of ex-
ternal noise. Because we felt participants have most experience adapting just to their own
internal motor noise, we included a condition with no external noise. We also included a
medium-noise condition because we were worried that the high-noise condition in Experi-
ment 2 had so much noise, participants could not discern what was optimal in the limited
number of trials they had.
2.4.1 Method
Participants. Twenty-five undergraduate students from the University of Michigan were
run in return for monetary compensation, none of whom were run in the previous experi-
ments. One participant was removed for failing to obey instructions early in the experiment
(by using the wrong fingers on the finger keys).
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Experimental Design. The design was the same as in Experiment 2, except for two dif-
ferent levels of external noise. In the no-noise condition, participants did not have a random
number added to their IRI. In the medium-noise condition, participants IRI included a ran-
dom number generated from a Gaussian Distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
of 25.
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Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2. Note that even in the no-
noise condition, participants were still instructed that there would be external noise affect-
ing their performance, so that we could give them the same instructions we gave all other
participants.
2.4.2 Results
All results, as in Experiment 2, came from only the final six real blocks.
The overall omnibus F-test revealed a significant difference in IRIs across our condi-
tions, F(3, 20) = 25.274, p < .001. We then computed contrasts across all four groups and
found that the mean Inter-Response Interval (IRI) for all participants in the Accuracy Pay-
off, 51.55 msec, was significantly greater than the mean IRI for participants in the Speed
Payoff, 22.12 msec, t(20) = 6.37, p < .001. Accuracy-payoff IRI was longer than that of




























14 10.60 79.17 79.17
Overall 34.50 15.42 92.21 88.25
Table 2.3. Comparison of mean IRIs across payoffs.
We also computed a contrast to examine whether participants again adapted to the level
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of external noise. We found that the mean IRI of the medium-noise participants was 49.61
msec, significantly longer than that for the no-noise participants, 24.06 msec, t(20) = 5.53,
p < .001.
For groups with the same level of external noise, but different payoffs, we computed
contrasts that showed within either payoff, medium-noise participants had longer IRIs than
no-noise participants. For participants in the speed condition, medium-noise mean IRI of
30 was significantly slower than the no-noise mean IRI of 14, t(20) = 2.32, p < .005, for
accuracy, medium-noise mean IRI of 69 was greater than no-noise mean of 34 msec, t(20)
= 5.59, p < .001.
We also computed contrasts that compared accuracy-payoff no-noise participants with
speed-payoff no-noise participants, to make sure that when controlling for external noise,
we still found differences in payoffs. For medium-noise, we found that accuracy-payoff
mean IRI of 69 was significantly longer than speed-payoff mean IRI of 30 msec, t(20) =
6.03, p < .001, and for no-noise, we also found that accuracy-payoff no-noise mean IRI
of 34 msec was significantly longer than the mean speed-payoff no-noise mean IRI of 14
msec, t(20) = 2.98, p < .01.
Once again, accuracy based solely on internal motor noise differed across payoffs, after
doing the arc-sine transform, with accuracy-payoff participants being more accurate than
speed-payoff participants, t(20) = 8.12, p < . 001.
We also got similar results as in Experiment 2 for accuracy after factoring in external
noise. Participants who had the Accuracy Payoff were more accurate (98.08%) than par-
ticipants in the Speed Payoff (78.42%), t(20) = 9.726, p < .001. Once again, the effect of
noise was not significant, as medium-noise participants had accuracy of 88.08%, compared
to 88.42% in the no-noise condition, t(20) = .238, ns. Accuracy did not differ across noise
level for the two speed-payoff groups or for the two accuracy-payoff groups.
Optimal IRIs were calculated as in Experiment 2, except that the external noise was
now set to be 0 or 25. Figure 2.9 shows the difference between actual IRI and optimal
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Figure 2.9. Relative difference from optimal IRI by condition.
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Figure 2.10. Absolute difference from optimal IRI by condition.
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IRI in a barplot averaged over participants in each group. We can see that participants in
the no-noise condition were again closer to optimal than participants in the medium-noise
condition, although they both did very well. Generally all participants regardless of the
group were within 20 msec of optimal IRI. Accuracy participants again had too short IRIs,
and speed medium-noise participants had too long ones.
2.5 Discussion and Results Across Experiments 2 and 3
Across these two experiments, we hypothesized that participants could adapt optimally.
Although evidence supporting this was reported above, we decided to do some further tests
to see just how close to optimal participants were. The most straightforward test was just to
see if the mean of the difference from optimal differed from 0. We found that in the Speed
No-Noise condition, the difference of 0.58 msec from optimality was not reliable (t(5) =
.15, p> .8), nor was there a reliable difference in the speed low-noise condition (M = -2.67,
t(5) = 1.44, p> .2). In all other conditions, this mean did significantly differ from 0.
Although this may seem disappointing, before blindly defining significance based on
p-values, we have to take into account effect sizes. For example, in the speed medium-
noise condition, we found a reliable difference from 0 (M = -8.17, t(5) = -2.81, p<.05).
However, if this mean only differed by one msec, so that the mean difference from optimal
IRI was -7.17, this difference would no longer be significant t(5) = -2.47, p=.06. We have
to be careful of over interpreting a null effect, but we clearly did not find strong evidence
supporting the claim that the mean IRIs of these participants significantly differed from 0,
except in the high-noise condition (M = -40.83.
For the accuracy payoffs, we initially found all conditions significantly differed from
0. But again, the effect sizes were usually very small. In the no-noise condition, the mean
difference from optimality of 12.83 was highly significant (t(5) = 4.49, p< .01). However,
if we added 6 msec to the mean IRI for each participant, this was no longer significantly
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Figure 2.11. Individual participant’s IRI as a function of standard deviation of IRI in the
low-external-noise, accuracy-payoff condition. The vertical black line is the participant’s
95% CI for optimal IRI
different. In the low-noise condition, we need only have added 4 msec to the mean IRI.
In the medium-noise condition, we would have to add 13 msec to no longer significantly
differ; in the high-noise condition 30 msec.
Another concern for us was to ensure that it was non-trivial to perform optimally. As
Roberts & Pashler (2000) point out, a good fit is not enough, if the range that qualifies
as a good fit is quite broad. Figure 2.11 shows an individual participant in the low-noise
condition from the Accuracy Payoff. The vertical arrows are his actual IRI with his 95%
confidence interval. The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence band to perform opti-
mally. One can see that if he performed only 10 msec faster or slower, he would no longer
be optimal. Yet given his internal noise level (on the x-axis), he essential achieved the op-
timal IRI. Given how narrow the band is, this is impressive performance and not likely to
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Figure 2.12. Individual participant’s IRI as a function of standard deviation of IRI in the
high-external-noise, accuracy-payoff condition. The vertical black line is the participant’s
95% CI for optimal IRI.
have resulted just by chance.
Participants in the high-noise condition had mean IRIs that were too short, as can seen
by the typical participant in Figure 2.12. This participant had an actual IRI of about 120
msec, but optimal would have been 30 msec or so longer than that. Still, we notice that
he was at least heading in the right direction, with a longer IRI than the typical participant
in the low-noise condition. Accuracy participants should be cautious about making errors,
because they are so severely penalized. Yet participants in the accuracy high-noise con-
dition did not have 100% accuracy once we factor in the external noise, but only around
95%. Optimally, then, these participants would have longer IRIs and make fewer errors.
However, it does seem natural that participants, over the course of hundreds of trials, would
wonder if they could have shorter IRIs and maintain their accuracy. Of course, shorter IRIs
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result in more points until they make an error. This phenomenon is well known in the
reinforcement-learning literature as the difference in exploration versus exploitation (Sut-
ton & Barto, 1998). Participants who explore their strategy space at all can only discover
they are going too fast by making an error, which will result in sub-optimal performance.
Hence participant desire to explore the strategy space may be the reason we never got ac-
curacy of 100% factoring in external noise.
For the speed-payoff, we found that in the high-noise condition, participants had IRIs
that were too long, despite a fairly wide band around optimal. In the low-noise condition,
like in Figure 2.13, there is a very narrow band around optimal IRI, but four of the six
participants fell right within that narrow band1.
Figure 2.14 examines the relationship between optimality and total noise people must
adapt to. Total noise was simply the summation of people’s internal motor noise and the
external noise we added. The data comes from individual subjects in Experiments 2 and 3.
The first thing to notice in this figure is how a horizontal line right around 0 was the best
fit (technically, the best-fitting line had an intercept of 5.4 and a slope of 0.02, but neither
parameter significantly differed from 0, pr > .5 for both parameters); hence on average
people were optimal. Of course, closer inspection reveals that people in the Accuracy
Payoff tend to have a positive difference between optimal IRI and actual IRI, indicating
their actual IRI is too short. This can be seen in the behavioral data as well.
Conversely, participants in the speed-condition tend to be negative (or around 0) in
Figure 2.14. This indicates their actual IRI is too long. Generally, participants in the speed-
condition were close to mathematically optimal, as their difference from optimal IRI did
not differ from 0 in the no and low-noise condition, and only marginally so in the medium-
noise condition. In the high-noise condition for the speed-participants, the noise was too
much for participants to adapt optimally. All of these participants noticed that sometimes
they earned a lot of points, but no participant was able to figure out the pattern that would
1Of the other two participants, one was slightly too fast to fall within the band; the other participant was
about 20 msec too fast
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Figure 2.13. Individual Participant’s IRI as a function of standard deviation of IRI in the
low-external-noise, speed-payoff condition. The vertical black line is the participant’s 95%




















































Figure 2.14. Individual participants difference from optimal IRI by condition.
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result in optimal points.
2.6 General Discussion
Across our three experiments, we found clear evidence that people adapt so as to maxi-
mize the points they earn, by factoring in both an external payoff and their internal motor
noise, even in tasks where IRIs are as little as 15 msec and no more than 150 msec. In
both Experiments 2 and 3, we found a highly significant adaptation in the expected direc-
tion depending on the external payoff. We also formed 0-parameter mathematical models
using just the external payoff and participants’ level of internal motor noise and external
experimentally-controlled noise, and made models that did a good job of explaining the
human results. In cases with relatively low levels of total noise, we found that the av-
erage difference from mathematically-optimal performance was not significant. In a few
other cases, when we we did find a statistically-significant difference, this would not have
occurred if the average was just slightly different. In fact, due to possible measurement er-
rors, it is probably best not to overemphasize the importance of any difference from optimal
that is less than 10 msec.
We found that almost all participants had roughly similar amounts of internal motor
noise in this simple-IRI task, making individual differences difficult to analyze. Although
we were somewhat surprised by this initially, as evidenced by the fact that we did not think
to add external noise in Experiment 1, the fact that all of our participants were college grad-
uates who presumably have had numerous hours of practice with typing and text messaging
may explain this result. Participants who have to type letters in a particular order have had
extensive practice in doing an IRI task, so we may have found the limitation where internal
motor noise cannot be reduced further.
By experimentally manipulating external noise, we managed to find the range where
people are no longer able to achieve optimal strategy. Our participants adapted optimally
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or near-so up until 25 msec of external noise was added to the internal motor noise, creating
up to 45 msec of total noise participants had to adapt to. However, when we added 60 msec
of noise, participants were no longer able to adapt optimally. Somewhere between 45 and
80 msec of total noise participants could no longer properly adapt in the allotted number
of trials. We do not know if additional trials would have eventually allowed participants to
adapt better, or if they had already reached an asymptotic performance level.
Our results provide us with a clear guideline for determining how people strategize:
people’s goal is to choose the strategy that allows them to earn the most money. Often
finding this strategy is a non-trivial task, and it requires encouraging people to explore the
strategy space, then giving them feedback so they can assess how well a given strategy
works, and enough trials given the variability within a given strategy to ensure they reach
the proper conclusion for each strategy. Nonetheless, it is crucial to establish what is the
proximal goal in choosing a strategy if we want to understand human cognitive limitations.
If a strategy is clearly optimal in terms of how many points participants will earn, but
participants do not choose it, this may be a sign that there is some limitation in the mind
preventing that strategy from being chosen.
However, we have to be careful in interpreting the lack of some optimal strategic de-
cision as indicating a cognitive limitation. As we saw in the high-noise conditions, par-
ticipants did not choose the optimal strategy. With enough noise, participants will not be
able to discern whether one strategy is better or worse than another strategy, at least in a
reasonable number of trials. We also have to be careful about participants finding local
maximums in the strategy space. If a participant finds that Strategy A is better than Strat-
egy B, a participant may just continue using that strategy throughout the experiment, never
discovering that Strategy C would have been even better than both A and B. Hence it is very
important to encourage participants to fully explore the strategy space, as we did in Exper-
iments 2 and 3 via practice blocks and by having the experimenter encourage participants
to try something different on these blocks.
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An important result of this work is to show how important it is to use a point-system
to try to restrict a participant’s strategic choices. It may be that if you use participants
who are in the experiment for course credit or for an hourly rate of pay, they can adopt
any number of strategies that will maximize their goal. If for course credit, the participant
may choose the strategy that lets them finish the experiment the fastest. If paid by the
hour only, a participant may adopt the strategy that maximizes how much they earn, which
may require them to go as slow as possible! Hence it may be impossible to interpret a
participant’s results unless we somehow encourage participants to perform in a specifically
optimal way.
Although we used a point system where the points translated into money, there is some
reason to believe the point system alone may be sufficient. For one thing, video games for
years have used points to encourage performance by participants, even though often the
points do not matter monetarily. Another reason points alone may be sufficient is that quite
a few participants reported to the experimenter that they really enjoyed this experiment and
felt that they were competing against themselves, by continually trying to improve on every
block. It is thus clear that feedback is critically important in guiding performance, and in
order to maximize this competition with oneself, in later experiments in this dissertation,
we included feedback that showed how participants performed across different blocks, so
they could see if they had improved or not.
The fact that we can now deduce that maximizing points guides what strategy a par-
ticipant chooses, will be of crucial importance in Chapter 3, where we want to compare
different computational models of human performance. In order to compare different mod-
els, we need some criterion, and that criterion is points earned. We can thus deduce what
models maximize points, and compare those results to human performance.
There are some issues still to be resolved from these experiments. If we control for op-
timal performance, i.e. if two different strategies generate similar performance, is there any
way we can determine which strategies participants would choose? Is the soft-constraints
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hypothesis (Gray et al., 2006) correct, so that participants here would choose whichever
strategy minimizes time to perform the task? Do participants instead try to minimize cog-
nitive load? It also remains to introduce ideas from reinforcement learning to these types
of basic tasks, to determine whether optimal performance will occur regardless of noise




Executive Control of Task Interruptions
3.1 Introduction
Imagine you are a pilot, engaged in the complex task of flying your plane. Suddenly, an
alarm sounds, and you have to immediately focus your attention on averting a potential
disaster by dealing with whatever caused the interruption to occur. How is this interruption
going to affect you? Will you be able to resume flying the plane as soon as you are done
dealing with the alarm? Will there be a delay before you can resume flying? What about
dealing with this emergency - will you be slower because you are also processing informa-
tion about the airplane you are flying? Do you retain your memories of the logistic details
for the planes you are flying, its altitude and its heading, for example? This chapter helps
provide answers to these questions.
Most people deal with interruptions all the time, albeit not in times where every mil-
lisecond is critical. A common type of interruption involves cases where you can finish
some aspect of your initial task before responding to the interruption, such as with a tele-
phone call. However, interruptions that involve immediate processing are also common in
everyday life, including responding to a car horn while driving, a person tapping you on
the shoulder, or a fire alarm sounding.
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In this chapter, we will introduce a paradigm for studying task interruptions that require
immediate attention and a theoretical interpretation of what occurs during these interrup-
tions. We will begin by reviewing some of the major findings and procedures from other
areas of multiple-task performance - such as task switching and perfect time-sharing, in
part because these procedures can be modified to study task interruptions as well. In fact,
the procedure we employed for task interruptions can be thought of as the diametric op-
posite procedure to that most common in task-switching, i.e. the opposite of the standard
PRP procedure, or an Anti-PRP procedure.
Although there have been many studies on multiple-task performance, there have been
relatively few studies of how we deal with interruptions. Many of these existing studies are
naturalistic ones done by observing workers in their offices (e.g., Chisholm et al., 2001).
There have also been studies about the effects of interruptions on higher-level cognitive
processes such as decision-making (e.g., Speier et al., 1999). These studies, although useful
for ergonomic purposes and helping workplace efficiency, do not help us understand the
basic cognitive processes that occur when we have to respond to an immediate interruption.
Altmann and Trafton (2002) have begun to examine task interruptions in more depth.
They considered task interruptions to involve activating the proper goal. For example, if
you are doing Task 1 and then are interrupted by Task 2, you will have to activate the
proper goal for Task 2 before you can start that task. They further suppose that activating
a different goal takes time, a function of how often and how frequently that goal is used,
as explained by the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). Given
their theory, two hypotheses immediately follow. One hypothesis is that there will be an
“interruption lag” when the goal for the interrupting task must be activated and the goal
for the initial task must be suspended (Trafton et al., 2003; Altmann & Trafton, 2007).
During this interruption lag, a person can engage in different strategies, such as trying
to remember what they were doing in the initial task (retrospective rehearsal), or trying
to reach a critical point in the initial task (see Seifert et al., 1994, for a discussion on
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critical junctures in a task) so that when they suspend this task, they can look ahead for
how to proceed (prospective goal encoding). The second hypothesis is that there will be a
“resumption lag” such that after finishing the interrupting task, they will have to retrieve
the goal for the initial task (Altmann & Trafton, 2004, 2007). They have found evidence
supporting both of these hypotheses.
However, their tasks were relatively complicated, taking on the order of seconds to
perform. The fact that they were so complicated makes it difficult to break them down into
stages and understand the basic cognitive processes affected by interruptions. Further, the
fact that the tasks were so complicated may lead different participants to develop different
strategies for dealing with interruptions, making it hard to infer if these lags are unavoidable
or instead caused by strategic considerations.
A related area of multiple-task performance where the basic cognitive processes have
been studied is task switching. Task switching occurs when you have to complete two
tasks in close temporal proximity, such that after completing a first task, an individual
must shortly thereafter perform another, different task. One paradigm used to study task-
switching is the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) procedure (Welford, 1952; Meyer
& Kieras, 1997a). In this paradigm, a person is first presented with a stimulus correspond-
ing to a first task, which they must try to perform quickly and accurately. After some
interval, known as the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), a second stimulus is presented
corresponding to a second task that must be performed too. The plot of the reaction time
for performing the second task as a function of the SOA generates the PRP curve. A com-
mon finding is that when the SOA is very short, such that one stimulus is presented quickly
after the other, the reaction time for the second task is slow, much slower than when the
SOA is larger. The finding that as the SOA increases the reaction time for the second task
decreases is known as the PRP effect. Figure 3.2 shows an idealized version of the PRP
Effect. Note that there is an easy and hard second task, but that at the small SOA they have
the exact same RT, and slowly diverge as the SOA increases, until at longer SOAs the two
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Figure 3.1. A typical trial in the PRP procedure (cf. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a).
What accounts for the PRP effect? To understand it, we must understand the discrete
stage model of Saul Sternberg (1969a,b). The discrete stage model divides a task into
temporally separate processing stages, including stimulus-encoding, response selection,
and motor execution stages. According to Pashler (1994), the PRP effect is caused by
a response-selection bottleneck (RSB), so that the response-selection stage cannot occur
simultaneously for two different tasks. If so, then a person could not start selecting a
response for the second task until the response was selected for the first task. When the
SOA is large, the response for the first task will already have been selected before the
second task begins, so there is very little or no overlap in choosing the response for the
second task, resulting in no delay in completing the second task. So this bottleneck will
result in increased reaction times when the SOA is small enough to allow response selection
51
to overlap, and the smaller the SOA the larger the overlap, accounting for the PRP effect.











































Figure 3.2. Idealized version of the PRP effect.
PRP studies usually manipulate both the SOA and the different stages of the vari-
ous tasks, especially the response-selection stage. There are two major ways to change
response-selection difficulty: Stimulus-Response (abbreviated S-R) numerosity and S-R
compatibility. S-R numerosity refers to adjusting the number of stimuli you use, because
the more stimuli the harder it is to choose a response for any one stimulus. S-R compati-
bility refers to making the responses less compatible with the stimulus, such as by having
a spatial task where stimuli on the far left must be responded to with the right pinky fin-
ger (instead of the right index finger, which would be the most compatible response). By
varying the difficultly of the first task, one can see what effect this variation has on the
PRP effect. If there is a RSB, then making it more difficult to choose a response for Task 1
should have a corresponding delay in performing Task 2 at short SOAs. However, when the
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SOA is longer, response-selection will be finished for Task 1 before Task 2 commences, so
Task 2 RT should be the same in this case regardless of Task 1 response-selection difficulty.
Likewise in task-interruptions, it is important to manipulate the response-selection stage
of the initial, interrupted task. By manipulating it, we can see whether the response-
selection for the initial task affects how long it takes to do the interrupting task. If manipu-
lating response selection does not affect how long it takes to do the interrupted task or to do
the interrupting task, then this would suggest that response selection for the two tasks pro-
ceeds in parallel for the two tasks. If, instead, we find that manipulating response selection
increases the interrupting-task reaction time similarly to how long the response-selection
variation affects the uninterrupted early task, we will have support for a response-selection
bottleneck. If there is a bottleneck, then when you are executing one response-selection
stage, you have to wait for it to end before beginning the response-selection stage for the
other task. So making the early task have a response-selection stage that takes longer would
lead to a longer period when the participant has to wait while doing the interrupting task
and thus yield longer reaction times.
The results from perfect time-sharing experiments suggests that as long as stimulus
modality is not the same for the two tasks, there should be no response-selection bottle-
neck. However, there could still be a delay in the tasks caused by having two goals in
memory during those blocks where there are interrupts compared to those blocks without.
Previous researchers have found that until participants are highly learned in a task, they of-
ten adopt a conservative strategy that induces a response-selection bottleneck (Schumacher
et al., 1999). However, once participants were highly learned in a task, they adopted a
more daring strategy that no longer induced a seeming bottleneck. Hence we focused our
analyses on late-sessions only (Session 3), because by then participants should be highly
learned in the tasks and thus be able to select a wider range of strategies, including daring
strategies.
Later theorists (Meyer et al., 1995) showed that there does not need to be a response-
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selection bottleneck, but that people can set an arbitrary lock-out point before any one of
the stages, based on what their strategy dictates. Thus, there could be a response-selection
bottleneck, a motor-execution bottleneck, or a stimulus-identification bottleneck, or no bot-
tleneck at all. Meyer et al. argue that people have adaptive executive control (AEC), so that
people can adopt different strategies in order to maximize their success on complex tasks.
If there need not be any bottleneck when performing multiple tasks, then, hypothetically,
people should be able to do two tasks simultaneously at the same speed they could do each
task individually.
Researchers have tested for performance bottlenecks with research on time-sharing, i.e.,
doing two tasks at the same time. If there is a bottleneck in the response-selection stage
of a task, it seems likely that there should be a substantial delay in doing two tasks at the
same time as compared to doing either task individually (but see Byrne & Anderson, 2001).
However, Schumacher et al. (2001) have found that participants can perform two tasks at
the same time without a delay in either task. Specifically, one task was a visual-manual
task, where participants saw a visual stimulus and had to make a manual response; the
other task was an audio-vocal task where the participant heard a tone and then had to make
a vocal response. To achieve perfect time-sharing, it is imperative that the two stimuli be in
different sensory modalities, because if they are in the same modality, there may be delays
due to sensory or motor constraints, such as having to make an eye movement.
Schumacher et al. (2001) results also show that a person can simultaneously hold two
goals in working memory and can use either goal without any delay. It is important to
realize that the participants suffered no delay in doing both tasks at the same time compared
to when they did a single task during mixed blocks where they sometimes had to do both
tasks on a trial and sometimes only a single task . Participants did suffer a delay compared
to blocks where, on every trial, they only performed one of the tasks, and thus likely stored
only one goal in memory and never had to switch between tasks.
It is possible that having to store two goals in memory results in slower task perfor-
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mance even when using just one of the goals, which supports the Altmann goal-activation
theory (Altmann & Trafton, 2002, 2007) discussed below. This is also consistent with some
of the findings of switch costs from task-switching experiments (e.g., Rogers & Monsell,
1995). If storing two goals in working memory results in delayed performance, and even if
there is no response-selection bottleneck, then doing a task that is often interrupted would
be slower than doing it on blocks where you only perform that task by itself.
Further, if there need not be a response-selection bottleneck, then while performing the
interrupting task, a person may continue selecting a response for the initial task simultane-
ously with performing the interrupting task. Thus, changing the difficulty of the initial task
may have no effect on how long it takes somebody to do the interrupting task, because the
processing for the two tasks could occur in parallel. In fact, changing the difficulty of the
initial task may not have any effect on how long it takes to perform the interrupted initial
task, because a lot of the processing for this interrupted task could occur while the partic-
ipant is performing the interrupting task. So if people adopt a strategy with no bottleneck
whatsoever, they may be able to do the interrupted and interrupting tasks as quickly as they
can perform these tasks individually.
An interruption not only provides information to start a new task, but it also informs you
that you must stop doing the task that you were initially performing. Although multiple-
task experiments where a participant must stop a task she has begun to perform are still
fairly uncommon, there have been studies of stopping a task in single-task settings. These
experiments use a countermanding procedure (Osman et al., 1986, 1990; de Jong et al.,
1990). In this procedure, participants perform a simple or choice reaction-time task upon
receiving some signal, which is usually called the “go” signal. However, on some percent-
age of trials, they may receive another signal some time after the go signal which tells them
to “stop” performing the task. These studies have shown that there comes a “point of no
return” beyond which the participant cannot stop performing the task, even if she receives
the stop signal. This point is clearly important to consider when discussing interruptions,
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because it is also the “point of no interruption.” If participants are told to interrupt after this
point, it will be too late for them, and they will fail to interrupt. It is thus very important to
consider when exactly the interruption will occur, and at what stage of task processing the
initial task is then. If the interruption occurs during motor execution, that would be past the
point of no return.
So there are many studies of multiple-task performance that examine the basic cogni-
tive processes underlying those skills, and there are some new studies that have begun to
examine task interruptions. However, a study of task interruptions that examines the basic
cognitive components is still needed. A paradigm that we could use to study these inter-
ruptions is an “Anti-PRP” procedure. In this procedure, you have an initial task, but if and
when the second task comes along, you have to respond to this second task before respond-
ing to the initial task, and only after completing it would you resume the first task. This
matches our intuitive idea of what an interruption is, while allowing us to use some of the
same manipulations from the PRP procedure to see whether the task-interruption process
is different than when the first task has higher priority.
This study is important for many reasons. The Anti-PRP Procedure allows us to test
the response-selection bottleneck hypothesis in a different way than has been tested before.
Another prospect is that it will allow us to compare task interruptions to task switching.
There is no reason to assume that interruptions and switching are equivalent; interruptions
give you a motivation to retain some memory of the interrupted task, because you will
soon be resuming this task. Storing something in working memory takes time (Meyer
& Kieras, 1997a, estimate a 25 msec gating time); since this is not necessary for task
switching, it seems reasonable to expect that this will result in different performance than
for task switching. Finally, the fact that we are dealing with very basic tasks allows us to
computationally model human performance on task interruptions. This will help us gain
more insight into different strategies people adopt to deal with interruptions and what stages




















Figure 3.3. A typical trial in the “Anti-PRP” procedure.
We also manipulated the response mode that participants are in when performing a task
(Meyer & Kieras, 1997a). In “immediate mode,” a motor action is automatically produced
as soon as a response is selected. In “deferred mode,” the selected response is put into
working memory, and a motor action is produced only after the response is retrieved from
memory. The response mode you are in when doing a trial could have a large effect on how
you interrupt the task. In immediate mode, there is no natural pause between stages. The
participant is in a ballistic state where once they begin the task, they proceed to finish. The
only way the participant may be able to abort the task is to pull the task goal from memory,
so that the corresponding production rules associated with the task do not fire. However,
pulling the goal may have hidden costs that have not been studied. For example, when
resuming the task, where will you resume? Do you resume at the beginning of the stage in
which you aborted? Do you resume where you left off during that stage? How much time
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does it take to put the goal back in memory?
In deferred mode, though, there is a juncture in performing the task. When the se-
lected response is put into working memory, a participant may consider the task effectively
paused. It will not resume until she retrieves the response from working memory. Hence
a person would not have to pull a goal from memory to successfully interrupt a task in
deferred mode. Instead, she would just have to change control signals associated with re-
trieving a response from working memory. Hence if an interruption occurs during response
selection while in deferred mode, a person could choose to finish selecting that response,
store it in working memory, and then work on the interrupting task. Only after she has
finished that task, or at least finished a sufficient amount of the interrupting task, will they
retrieve their response from working memory for Task 1 and proceed to make a motor
action based on it.
Given these considerations, it is quite possible that an interruption when a person is
in immediate mode could be cataclysmic, but not so dire when the person is in deferred
mode. We examine this in our Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, participants were
trained to be in immediate mode, and in Experiment 2 participants were trained to be in
deferred mode. To encourage immediate mode, in the pure blocks where participants only
performed task 1, participants had to be faster than a deadline that encouraged them to re-
spond as quickly as possible on every trial. To encourage deferred mode, on a given trial in
the pure block participants were penalized if they responded before given a “go”signal, thus
encouraging them to put their selected response in working memory and only proceeding
when given the signal. In Experiment 3, we replicated Experiment 2, but with an important
difference: there was no motor interference between the responses. Motor interference may
contribute to some of the costs we associate with interruptions. Experiment 3 allows us to
examine this.
We found in Experiment 1, as predicted, that interrupting a task underway in immediate
mode had serious consequences, and seemed to make the participant lose the information
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they had ascertained for Task 1. In Experiment 2, we surprisingly got results rather similar
to those of Experiment 1, indicating that perhaps immediate versus deferred mode did not
affect the strategy participants used to interrupt. However, a closer analysis showed that
some of the results may have been caused by manual interference. Experiment 3 had less
costs associated with the interrupting task or the uncertainty of whether there will be an
interruption or not, and the modeling results provided support for the Strategic Response-
Deferment model (Meyer et al., 1995; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Schumacher et al., 1999). A
model with a single unlocking mechanism fit the data best, and the location of the unlocking
seemed to vary across participants, consistent with them adopting different strategies.
We also made computational models for our results in Experiment 3, for each partici-
pant in each condition, using a system called CORE (Howes et al., 2007; Vera et al., 2004),
which enables cognitively-bounded rational analysis. CORE is a Constraint-based Opti-
mizing Reasoning Engine that allows us to generate models that formally specify archi-
tectural constraints and strategy spaces. This is extremely useful in modeling multitasking
performance. By using CORE, we can construct models that assume there is a response-
selection bottleneck, and other models that assume there is not. CORE also allows us to
remain agnostic about the different assumptions made by different cognitive architectures,
such as EPIC and ACT-R.
CORE, naturally, is in many ways similar to other cognitive architectures. However,
instead of “production rules” of the form IF certain conditions are met THEN some action
is performed, CORE uses a Information-Requirements Grammar (IRG; Howes et al., 2005).
This approach, like production rules, supports temporal properties and information flows,
i.e. the particular process will only occur when certain conditions are met. However, the
grammar also requires a specification of which resource is needed to perform the process.
For example, a selection process would require the cognition resource, so if that resource
was already full via another process or processes, then that selection process could not
proceed until cognition was sufficiently available.
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That an IRG rule makes use of the resource is one way CORE models can independently
vary the architecture. For example, ACT-R assumes that cognition is a unitary function akin
to the RSB, in other words when cognition is engaged by one process it cannot be used by
another process. EPIC assumes there is no RSB, so when cognition is engaged by one
process, it can concurrently be engaged by another process. In CORE, we can change
whether to model cognition as a unitary function or not. In this way, we can change the
architectural assumptions, and then use the Information-Requirements Grammar to specify
specific strategy knowledge. The IRG can also be used to specify a space of strategies, not
just a single strategy. For example, in a PRP task the wait-time between the first key-press
and the second key-press seems to be strategically selected. We could make an IRG rule for
this wait time that has the wait process come from a Normal Distribution with a variable
mean. When we then calibrate our model, we could generate a variety of different means
for our wait-time, say from 1 msec to 500 msec by 25 msec increments. CORE models
will automatically form and test models for all the different means we specified. If we had
other processes that also vary strategically, the IRG would form hierarchical models across
all the different strategic variables. So if another process varied from 1 to 100 msec by 25
msec increments, CORE would then generate models for the 20 different wait-times * the
4 different mean processes for the other variable, generating 80 different strategies. CORE
then automatically compares these strategies and selects whichever strategy (or strategies)
earns the most points per trial on average. CORE modeling was a natural fit for our desire
to test a wide range of strategies.
3.2 Experiment 1
3.2.1 Method
Participants. Fourteen undergraduate students participated as paid volunteers. All par-
ticipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were paid $8.00 per hour plus
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bonuses based on the quality of their performance. Because of computer problems, three
participants were removed from further analyses. All participants performed for three ses-
sions over three days, with each session occurring no later than two days after the previous
session.
Apparatus. Visual stimuli were presented on the display screen of a 17-inch Sony Trini-
tron monitor connected to a Pentium personal computer. Participants sat about 80 cm from
the monitor in a quiet room. Responses were made with a piano-type response keyboard.
It had two groups of three finger keys, with one group for each hand. The experiment was
controlled by a program written in E-prime.
Experimental Design and Procedure
Tasks. Participants performed three different tasks on three different types of trials
during the experiment. The three types of task were an easy-digit task, a hard-digit task, and
a tone task. The three different types of trials were homogenous (pure) task, heterogeneous
(mixed) single task, and dual task. There were also two types of trial-blocks, pure and
mixed. In a pure block, the participant always performed a homogenous task, i.e. the same
single task was performed on every trial, and the participant always knew what that task
would be. In a mixed block, half of the trials were dual task trials, and half of the trials
were heterogeneous single task trials. A heterogeneous single task trial was a trial where
the participant performed a single task on that trial, but was not aware before the trial started
that it would be a single-task trial. A dual-task trial required the participant to perform two
tasks. The first (early) task was always a digit task, but a second (late) task occurred on
these trials. The late task was always the tone task.
Pure Single-Task Trial Blocks (Easy-Digit Task). On each trial of the pure single-
task blocks with the easy digit task, the participant first saw a 42 by 42 pixel (0.438 x
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0.438 inches) square in the center of the display screen. After 500 msec, a digit written in
36-pixel Arial font appeared in the center of the square. The digit was either 1, 2 or 3. If
the digit was 1, the participant made a right-index finger key press. If the digit was 2, the
participant made a right middle-finger key press. If the digit was 3, the participant made a
right ring-finger key press. Figure 3.4 is a graphical representation of one of these trials.
Note that basically the participant is taught to respond as soon as the stimulus is present,








Task 1 Reaction Time
Figure 3.4. A typical trial on a single-task trial. Note it encourages “immediate mode”
because participants are taught to respond as soon as they can.
A deadline was imposed based on the participant’s previous reaction times for this trial
type. The deadline was computed for the next block by averaging the 75th percentile of
the RT distribution from the last block of this type with the previous deadline for this
block type. Participants received 200 points minus their reaction time divided by 10 if they
responded correctly and beat this deadline. They lost 200 points for an incorrect answer.
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They lost 100 points for being slower than the deadline. During Sessions 2 and 3, if a
participant responded within 50 msec after the deadline, she received one-fourth of the
points that would have been given if she had beaten the deadline. Visual and auditory
feedback were provided after each trial, telling the participant if her response was correct,
almost fast enough, too slow, or incorrect. She was also told how many points she earned
or lost. The inter-trial interval was 500 msec.
Each of these blocks had 36 trials. During Session 1, participants performed this task
for 6 blocks; during Sessions 2 and 3, participants performed this task for 5 blocks.
Pure Single-Task Trial Blocks (Hard-Digit Task). The pure single-task blocks with
the hard digit task were similar to those with the easy digit task. On each trial, the digit
could be 1 - 9. The participant responded with her right index finger if the digit was 1, 4
or 6. If the digit was 2, 7, or 8, the participant responded with her right middle finger. If
the digit was 3, 5 or 9, the participant responded with her right ring finger. The deadline
was based on reaction times from previous trial blocks of this type and was computed in
the same way as was the deadline for the easy-digit single-task blocks.
Pure Single-Task Trial Blocks (Tone Task). On each trial of the single-task blocks
with the tone task, participants saw the same fixation as for the digit tasks. After 500 msec,
a tone occurred. If the tone was high-pitched (3195 Hz), the participant made a left index-
finger key press. If the tone was medium-pitched (880 Hz), the participant made a left
middle-finger key press. If the tone was low-pitched (196 Hz), the participant made a left
ring-finger key press. The tones were chosen to be easily discriminated. A deadline was
imposed on performance of the tone task in the same manner as were the deadlines for the
digit tasks. The points and feedback were the same as for the digit task. The inter-trial
interval was 1000 msec. Participants performed the tone task for 10 pure single-task blocks
of 36 trials during each of the three sessions.
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Easy Mixed Dual-Task Trial Blocks. On each trial of the mixed dual-task blocks
with the easy digit task, participants saw the same fixation square as on single-task trial
blocks. For half of these trials, the events were exactly the same as on easy-digit single-task
trials, although the point system differed. Participants still received 200 points - RT/10 for
responding correctly before the deadline, and still lost 200 points for incorrect responses.
To emphasize responding quickly and prevent strategies that focused exclusively on accu-
rate performance, participants now lost 200 points for responding slower than the deadline.
To compensate for this harsher penalty, during Sessions 2 and 3 if these participants re-
sponded within 100 msec (not 50 msec as in the pure single-task trial blocks) of the dead-
line, they were given one-fourth of the points that they would have gotten for responding
correctly before the deadline.
For the other half of these trials, participants first saw a digit, but after a certain time
(the stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA), they heard one of the three tones of the tone task.
Synchronously with the tone, a large (97 by 97 pixels, or 1.01 by 1.01 inches) box sur-
rounded the original square and digit was displayed. Participants had to respond to this
tone (in the same way as they responded to the tones on single-task tone blocks) before
responding to the digit. After the response to the tone, the large square disappeared from
the screen, leaving the original square and digit on the display. Participants then responded
to the digit after responding to the tone. See Figure 3.3 for a graphical representation of
these interrupt trials.
Following both responses, participants received visual and auditory feedback about how
they had performed on the digit and tone tasks. Deadlines were imposed for both tasks; they
had the same magnitudes as for the immediately prior corresponding single-task blocks. To
discourage participants from initially ignoring the digit task and just waiting for the tone
task to occur, and to encourage a quick response to the second interrupting task, we invoked
a harsher penalty for responding after the deadline. A response after the deadline resulted in
a loss of 200 points on these trials, for both the early digit and the late tone task. However,
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because the dual-task blocks were more difficult than the corresponding single-task blocks,
there was a 100 msec window after each deadline in which the participant was told “almost”
and received one quarter of the points she would have gotten for beating the deadline.
The SOA was set by a staircase-tracking algorithm so that on 70% of the dual-task
trials, participants were successfully able to postpone the digit task. On the other 30% of
these trials, the tone occurred but participants did not postpone responding to the digit task.
For these “failures to postpone,” participants lost 100 points, and received no feedback
about how they did on the digit task. In all other respects, the feedback was the same
as on single-task blocks; performance on each task was awarded points independently of
performance on the other task. Treating the two tasks independently allowed participants
the greatest range of strategies. So even if a participant responded incorrectly to the tone
task, they could still receive points if they successfully responded to the digit task. The
inter-trial interval was 1000 ms. Participants had 9 dual-task blocks (each with 36 trials)
during Session 1, and 10 blocks during Sessions 2 and 3.
Hard Mixed Dual-Task Trial Blocks. The hard mixed dual-task blocks were like the
easy mixed dual-task blocks except for two changes. First, participants performed the pure
hard early task throughout these blocks. Second, the SOA was set to have the exact same
distribution as for the previous easy dual-task block. This meant that the tone occurred
earlier than it would have if it had been set by a staircase-tracking algorithm to successfully
postpone 70% of the responses for the hard-digit task.
3.2.2 Results
We are most interested in the participants performance after they learned the task; we are
not as interested in the learning process. Therefore we will only analyze data from the
final session, after participants had already learned how to perform the task. Two partic-
ipants never mastered the task, having poor accuracy even on their final session. These
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participants were removed from further analyses.
We divided our participants into two subsets. One subset we call “groupers” because
they grouped their finger-presses on dual-task trials, responding to the digit task within
100 msec after completing the tone task, consistent with the idea that these participants
were “grouping” their two manual responses. The other subset we call “switchers” because
participants took a relatively long time to respond for the resumed digit task, consistent
with the idea that they were switching from doing the tone task to doing the digit task.
Figure 3.5 shows a density distribution of these groups. Note that groupers have very little
variance and are less than 100 msec for both the easy and hard-digit case. Switchers have
much larger variance, are 72 msec slower on average in the hard-digit case than in the
easy-digit case (compared to 21 msec differences for switchers), and are slower than the
groupers in both the easy and hard-digit case. We analyzed these groups of participants
separately.
We will begin by examining performance on the pure digit blocks, to ensure that our
manipulation of response-selection difficulty worked as planned. We will then examine
performance on the pure tone blocks, which is useful in understanding the results from the
dual-task blocks. Through all of these blocks, we will examine overall statistics across
participants and also examine switchers and groupers separately, to see how fundamental
the differences between them are. After examining the pure blocks, we will examine per-
formance on the easy-digit mixed-trial block. We will examine the uninterrupted trials,
to see what the effect of often being interrupted is. Then we will look at results from in-
terrupted trials, examining groupers and switchers separately, because they perform these


















































































Figure 3.5. Distribution of “groupers” and “switchers” in easy and hard-digit task.
Digit Task. Before interpreting the effects of manipulating the difficulty of the digit
task, we first have to ensure that our manipulation actually affected response selection.
Analyses across all participants showed that the average median reaction time (the mean of
participants median reaction times) for the easy-digit task was 310 msec (standard deviation
= 20 msec, inter-quartile range = 26 msec), with an average accuracy of 92.5%; for the
hard-digit task, the average median reaction time was 396 msec (sd = 35 msec, IQR = 54
msec), with an accuracy of 86.6%. Because the accuracy was lower for the hard-digit task,
we know that this cannot be a case of the speed-accuracy tradeoff. A t-test verified that
this was a significant difference (t(8) = 6.37, p < .001). All participants were slower on
the hard-digit task than on the easy-digit task. We also examined separately the reaction
time of trials during the hard-digit task where the digits 1, 2, 3 were used. These trials
were the exact same as the easy-digit task, so differences here can give a good idea of
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how much response-selection was affected. On these trials, the average of the median
reaction times was 363 msec (sd = 27 msec, IQR = 32 msec), with an accuracy of 90.93%.
This was a significant difference (t(8) = 4.73, p < .001), supporting our goal of affecting
response-selection (see Table 3.1). For the pure easy-digit task blocks, the average of the
median deadlines was 347 msec and participants were slower than the deadline 19.04%,
close to the 20% we desired. For the pure hard-digit task blocks, the average of the median






Median RT (msec) 310 396 362
Mean Accuracy (%) 92.5 86.6 88.3
Median RT for 1,2,3 Trials 310 363 —
Groupers - Median RT 307 391 344
Switchers - Median RT 312 412 386
Ultra-Switchers - Median RT 315 433 436
Table 3.1. Results for pure-task blocks.
Groupers. The five participants classified as groupers had an average median RT of 307
msec (sd = 25 msec, IQR = 31 msec), and an average accuracy of 91.89% for the easy-digit
task. For the hard-digit task, groupers had an average median RT of 391 msec (sd = 26
msec, IQR = 30 msec) and an accuracy of 87.5%.
Switchers. The four participants classified as switchers had an average median RT of
314 msec (sd = 14 msec, IQR = 24 msec) and an average accuracy of 93.2% for the easy-
digit task. For the hard-digit task, switchers had an average median RT of 402 msec (sd =
48 msec, IQR = 76 msec) and an accuracy of 85.8%. There was not a significant difference
between groupers and switchers for the easy-digit task (t(7) = .47, p = ns) nor for the hard-
digit task (t(7)=.45, p = ns). Note that the ultra-switchers and switchers had similar RTs
for the digit task, but that the ultra-switchers were slower in the pure-tone task, although
with only two participants in each condition, we cannot test if this difference is significant.
Hence for these analyses, we averaged together switchers and ultra-switchers.
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Tone Task. The pure tone-task block showed that participants were able to do the
tone task fairly quickly, with an average median reaction time of 362 msec (sd = 53 msec,
IQR = 31 msec) and accuracy of 88.3%. However, individual median reaction times varied
more for this task than for either of the two digit tasks, with a standard deviation of 53
msec compared to 20 msec for the easy-digit task and 35 msec for the hard-digit task. The
mean of each participant’s individual deadline was 451 msec and participants were slower
than the deadline 18.8%. Although groupers were slightly faster than switchers, 344 msec
compared to 384 msec, this difference was not significant (t(7) = 1.02, p = ns).
Easy-Digit Mixed-Trial Blocks
Uninterrupted Trials. In the mixed-task blocks it seemed likely that often being in-
terrupted should slow performance even on those trials that had no interruption. We will
refer to this delay as the “uncertainty effect” because it is caused by the participant being
uncertain about whether the next trial would involve an interruption. The average median
RT for the uninterrupted easy-digit task, across all participants, was 410 msec. The average
uncertainty effect across participants for the easy-digit task was 100 msec. This is a con-
siderable cost, when we consider that the easy-digit task only took 310 msec on the pure
blocks where there was never an interruption, a 32% increase. However, individuals varied
considerably in how large an uncertainty effect they had for the easy-digit task. The stan-
dard deviation was 37.95 msec (IQR = 40 msec), and participants had uncertainty effects
that ranged from 145 to 22 msec. Accuracy on these trials was also quite high at 98.7%.
Although this suggests a speed-accuracy tradeoff, a look at the percentage of time they
were slower than the deadline (for which they lost points) shows that the gain in accuracy
was not worth the time they lost. Participants were too slow on 81.6% of the uninterrupted
trials. Thus, participants were slower than the deadline 62.5% more in this condition than
in the pure easy-digit task.






Uncertainty Effect 95 105 104
Mean SOA 219 241 241
Interrupted Digit-Task RT 261 368 364
Tone-Task RT 489 498 624
Interrupting Lag 146 112 188
Table 3.2. Results for easy-digit mixed blocks.
deviation of 54 msec, an inter-quartile range of 78 msec, an average accuracy of 98.4%,
and were too slow on 78.3% of these trials. The average uncertainty effect was 95 msec.
Switchers: The four switchers had an average median RT of 420 msec, with a standard
deviation of 46 msec, an IQR of 70.5 msec, an average accuracy of 98.7%, and were too
slow on 85.7% of these trials. No difference was significant between groupers and switch-
ers. The average uncertainty effect was 106 msec. Note that switchers and ultra-switchers
had very similar patterns of data on non-interrupted trials, so these two subsets were col-
lapsed together here.
Interrupted Trials. Groupers: As Table 2 shows, the average SOA for the groupers
was 219 msec. At this point, they heard the tone, and then had to respond to it. They were
unable to postpone doing the easy-digit task on 30.3% of the trials, as determined by our
staircase tracking algorithm. They then started the tone task. The average of the median
RTs for the tone task was 489 msec (sd = 53 msec, IQR = 62 msec), with an average
accuracy of 90.7%. This is considerably slower than on the pure tone-trial blocks. We will
refer to this difference between the pure tone-trial reaction time and the interrupting tone
reaction time as the “interrupting lag.” The average interrupting lag for groupers was 146
msec.
The reaction time for an interrupted digit task did not include the time during which the
participant was performing the tone task. Hence the total reaction time for an interrupted
digit trial included the SOA and the time from when the participant responded to the tone
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Figure 3.6. Inter-response interval differences between “groupers” and “switchers”, both
groups have similar lags in doing interrupted tone task compared to pure tone task.
task until they responded to the digit task. For the interrupted easy-digit task, the average
of their median RTs was 261 msec (sd = 69 msec, IQR = 36 msec), but subtracting the
average SOA from this time, this corresponds to taking 42 msec after responding to the
tone to respond to the digit. The average accuracy on the interrupted easy-digit task was
96.4%.
We also examined the correlation between interrupting tone RT and the time from
tone onset until the response to the interrupted digit RT. Because these two variables have
the same onset, they are not independent and thus we expected a strong correlation, but
nonetheless we expected that groupers should have a particularly strong correlation. We
found that the average correlation for the groupers was .93.
Switchers: The average SOA for the four people who were classified as switchers was
241 msec. These participants failed to postpone 28.9% of the time, around the 30% we
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desired. For the tone task, the average of their median RTs was 529 msec (sd = 97 msec,
IQR= 63 msec) with an accuracy of 91.6%. The average of their interrupting lags was
145 msec. This is equivalent to that of the groupers. However, the average RT for the
interrupted digit task was 373 msec (sd = 41 msec, IQR = 48 msec) with an accuracy of
97.4%. This corresponds to taking 132 msec to complete the digit task after it resumes,
considerably longer than for the groupers.
The average correlation for the switchers between tone RT and the time from tone onset
until the response to interrupted digit RT was .81.
Although we collapsed switchers and ultra-switchers here, an argument could be made
that they seem to differ on interrupted tone-task RT. However, this difference was largely
caused by one participant who had a median RT for the interrupting tone task of 756 msec,
whereas the ultra-switcher had a median interrupting tone-task RT of 492 msec. This par-
ticipant’s tone-task RT is very similar to that of the two participants classified as switchers,
so we decided just to collapse these four participants together into one subset.
Hard-Digit Mixed-Trial Blocks
Uninterrupted Trials. The average RT for the uninterrupted hard-digit task was 450
msec, with an average uncertainty effect of 54 msec across subjects and a standard deviation
of 28 msec. Individual participants ranged from having a -5 msec (being faster on the
uninterrupted trials of the mixed blocks than on the pure blocks) to having a 93 msec
uncertainty effect. Accuracy here was also higher (90.9%) than on the corresponding pure
blocks (85.7%), t(8) = 2.61, p<.05. Participants in this condition were too slow on 41.6%
of the trials, not much more often than for the pure hard-digit task, as only 23.9% of the
time more often are they too slow.
Groupers: The five participants had an average median RT of 442 msec (sd = 35 msec,
IQR = 60 msec) on the uninterrupted hard-digit task, with an average accuracy of 89.7%.
They were slower than the deadline 42.1% of the time. Their average uncertainty effect
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was 52 msec.
Switchers: The four participants had an average median RT of 460 msec (sd = 36 msec,
IQR = 48 msec), with an average accuracy of 91.9%. They were slower than the deadline





Uncertainty Effect 52 47 69
Mean SOA 222 243 228
Interrupted Digit-Task RT 284 381 497
Tone-Task RT 552 530 636
Interrupting Lag 208 193 235
Table 3.3. Results for hard-digit mixed blocks.
Interrupted Trials. Groupers: The average SOA for these participants was 222 msec,
similar to the SOA for the easy-digit task. These participants failed to postpone doing the
hard-digit task 23.4% of the time. This is what we expected, because an interruption in
an earlier stage of task processing makes one more likely to be able to postpone that task.
These participants had an average RT on the tone task of 552 msec (sd = 61 msec, IQR = 70
msec), with an accuracy of 86.4%. The average interrupting lag was 208 msec, and overall
the interrupting lag was larger for the hard digit task than for the easy dual-task block (t(16)
= 2.96, p < .01). Note, however, this difference was less than the difference between the
pure easy-digit task and pure hard-digit task RT. The average median RT for the interrupted
hard-digit task was 284 msec (sd = 69 msec, IQR = 7 msec) with an accuracy of 92.1%.
This indicates that these participants took 62 msec to respond to the digit after responding
to the tone.
Switchers: Switchers in this condition were further sub-divided into two subsets: one
called “switchers” and one called “ultra-switchers.” The switchers are ones who have the
same pattern of results for the hard-dual trials as the easy-dual trials. Ultra-switchers had a
































Figure 3.7. Inter-response interval differences between “groupers,” “switchers” and “ultra-
switchers;” all groups have the same slowdown in doing interrupted tone task compared to
pure tone task, which we refer to as the “interrupting lag.”
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tone task and the interrupted hard-digit task than switchers or groupers. Two participants
were classified as switchers, and two as ultra-switchers. Switchers had an average SOA
of 243 msec and failed to postpone 24.3% of the time. For the tone task, the average of
their median RTs was 530 msec with an accuracy of 82.1% and an average interrupting lag
of 193 msec. The difference in interrupting lag between switchers and groupers was not
significant here (t(7) = .16, p=ns). For the interrupted digit task, these participants had an
average median RT of 381 msec with an accuracy of 92.2%. These participants spent, on
average, 138 msec on the resumed hard-digit task.
Ultra-Switchers: Ultra-switchers had an average SOA of 227.5 msec. They failed to
postpone 18.9% of the time. For the tone task, the average of the median RTs was 636 msec,
with an accuracy of 93.1%. The average interrupting lag was 235 msec. For the interrupted
hard-digit task, the average median RT was 497 msec with an accuracy of 93.9%. So these
participants spent 269 on this task.
3.2.3 Discussion
In Experiment 1 we discovered how difficult it is to interrupt when the interrupted task,
Task 1, is performed in immediate mode (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a). This can be deduced
by looking at the “interrupting lag” for Task 2, the slowdown in responding to the tone task
on dual-task trials compared to performing the tone task on pure-task trials. For the easy-
digit mixed-trial blocks, both sets of participants (i.e. “groupers” and “switchers”) had
about a 145 msec slowdown, an approximately 40% slowdown compared to how quickly
participants performed when just doing the tone-task. When doing the hard-digit mixed-
trial blocks, the interrupting lag was even greater, being about 200 msec, about a 50%
slowdown. This was done in spite of the payoff being structured to emphasize performance
on Task 2. Why was there such a large lag?
One clue is the fact the interrupting lag differed in the easy and hard-digit task. Note
that the tone task is the exact same in the conditions, so this difference indicates that the
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response-selection difficulty of the digit task affected performance on the tone task. It
appears that some of the processing of the digit-task response selection occurred while
the participants should have processed only the tone task, consistent with the response-
selection bottleneck hypothesis. However, note that the difference in interrupting lag was
only about 50 msec, only about half as much as the 90 msec response-difficulty effect.
However, without careful modeling of this task, we cannot be sure if this fact is consistent
with the RSB or not.
That we found evidence of processing of Task 1 when people should be processing
Task 2 is not surprising for certain sub-sets of our participants. We found that some of
our participants seemed to group their responses to Task 2 and Task 1, such that from the
time they make their first key press, they took less than 50 msec to make their second key
press. This speed is not enough for them to engage in response-selection for the interrupting
task after making their key press for Task 2, hence response selection for Task 2 must be
completed before these participants began their key press for Task 1. Yet the participants
who grouped their responses did not have larger interrupting lags than did those participants
who seemed to switch between doing the two tasks.
Switchers was the label we applied to those participants who took longer to respond to
the interrupted digit-task. These participants took about 140 msec to resume their response
to the digit-task, or as much as 250 msec in the case of those participants we labeled “ultra-
switchers.” These participants could have engaged in response-selection for Task 1 simul-
taneously with their motor-production for Task 2, in which case they should not have any
lag in doing Task 2, because motor-production rules for one task should not interfere with
cognitive rules for the other task. And yet, they still exhibit just as much lag as groupers,
indicating that they had still engaged in response selection for Task 1, before selecting a
response for Task 2, and then they chose a response again for Task 1.
We have some clues about individual differences that contribute to making a person
a “grouper,” “switcher,” or “ultra-switcher.” The biggest factor seems to be how quickly
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participants performed the pure-tone task. Participants who performed the pure-tone task
quickly tended to become groupers. Those participants who were slowest on the pure-tone
task tended to become ultra-switchers. It is possible that participants who took the longest
to do the tone task realized that they had to prioritize finishing the tone-task response se-
lection as soon as possible, so were more willing to abort task 1 response selection before
gating their response into working memory, resulting in the need to do response-selection
for Task 1 again, which they did either in parallel with motor preparation for Task 2 (switch-
ers) or after motor preparation was finished for Task 2 (ultra-switchers).
Evidence for the differences between switchers and groupers comes in part from the
slowdown in uninterrupted task 1 trials on mixed-blocks compared to on pure-blocks, the
so-called “uncertainty effect.” From Chapter 2, we know that participants tend to be rational
and try to find the optimal solution to maximize their points. And yet we found that our
participants slowed down on trials during the mixed-blocks that were the exact same as
on the pure-blocks. Why? Because participants knew that there was some chance that the
trial would be interrupted during a mixed-block, so they were trying to optimize the points
they earned on average across both single-task trials and dual-task trials. To do this, they
probably realized it was much easier if they interrupted while they were still perceptually
processing Task 1. Once they had begun selecting a response for Task 1, participants found
that they could not really interrupt without severe consequences, which will be discussed
below. So participants would wait longer on a given trial to see if it was an interruption,
and only when they were confident it was a single-task trial would they begin selecting a
response for Task 1. Of course, we used a variable SOA, so even if participants waited
to begin selecting a response, the SOA would change such that they were still interrupted
after they had begun selecting a response for Task 1.
Participants were thus stuck between a rock and a hard place: if participants did Task 1
as fast as they could, then interruptions would cause severe problems and cost them points
on dual-task trials. If instead participants waited to see if the trial was a dual-task trial, then
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the SOA would change such that as soon as the participant began to process Task 1, only
then would the interruption occur.
The interruption caused such severe interference perhaps because participants had learned
to do Task 1 in immediate mode. This meant that as soon as participants had finished se-
lecting a response, they immediately proceeded to make a response. This clearly was a
problem if they were interrupted at some point by Task 2, before the point-of-no-return
where they should still have been able to inhibit their response to Task 1 (Logan & Cowan,
1984; de Jong et al., 1990). In the case of this interruption, then, participants had to pull
their goal associated with Task 1 in order to stop responding to Task 1 before their re-
sponded to Task 2. Pulling the goal meant participants still had to process Task 1, as the
work they did in selecting the response was not stored in working memory. Hence partic-
ipants, especially switchers, indeed seemed to select a response for Task 1 twice, as they
did not remember what response they stored the first time. Groupers, in contrast, may have
somehow remembered their response to Task 1, perhaps by pulling their goal later in pro-
cessing. Their interrupting lag, then, is caused only partially by a delay before they began
selecting a response for Task 2. The primary cause of their lag is electing to do a “patter
response” where they pressed one finger on one hand and then quickly pressed a finger
on the other hand. Patter responses are complicated responses, so take longer to prepare,
estimated in EPIC to take 200 msec, since four features need to be specified (hand/finger
for each response) compared to 100 msec for a single finger response when hand must also
be specified.
Thus, participants in immediate mode do not seem capable of successfully interrupting
without a large cost. We also made it too hard for participants to come up with an optimal
strategy of dealing with the variable SOA and at the same time processing single-task trials.
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3.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 failed to achieve some of our original objectives; we did not get any evidence
of parallel response-selection in our participants, but a possible reason was problems in the
design of Experiment 1. The variable SOA made it so that participants did not even have a
chance to let response-selection overlap for the two tasks. We also encouraged participants
to be in immediate mode, so that as soon as they chose a response for Task 1 they proceeded
to produce it. We needed to encourage them more fully to be in deferred mode to see if
they could interrupt more easily when responses initially went to working memory instead
of directly to motor processors. Hence Experiment 2 was designed to correct these faults,
while at the same time making the procedure a bit easier for participants.
3.3.1 Method
Participants. Eight undergraduate students participated as paid volunteers. No partici-
pant was in Experiment 1.
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1.
Experimental Design and Procedure. The tasks were the same as in Experiment 1.
However, we made numerous changes in the design to further emphasize the interrupting
task on dual-task trials, and to allow for the possibility the response-selection overlap.
Pure Digit Tasks. We made two significant changes to the pure-digit tasks from Ex-
periment 1. First, we manipulated encoding difficulty by having intact legible and degraded
digits (digits that had pixels removed, making it harder to identify them). This has been
shown to affect the stimulus-encoding stage of a task, but not response-selection (Stern-
berg, 1969a). This manipulation made it more likely that the response-selection stage of
the two tasks would overlap and thus could reveal how people strategize needing to choose
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two responses simultaneously.
Another change concerned the fact that on single-task trials during mixed-blocks, par-
ticipants had to worry about there being an interruption, so this affected their strategy and
made it hard to compare their results to the pure-task trials. For the mixed-blocks, based on
concepts from EPIC, we believed participants were in a “deferred” mode whereby the cho-
sen response went directly to working memory. For pure-blocks of Experiment 1, however,
we believed that participants were in “immediate” mode whereby the chosen response went
directly to motor processors to produce movements. We thus felt participants had to be in
deferred mode on pure blocks, to allow for direct comparisons between pure and mixed
blocks. To do this, participants saw a large red box around the digit on pure blocks, and
they were not allowed to respond until the box turned green. The box had three different
SOAs for the easy digit task: 0, 200, or 400 msec. For the hard digit-task, the SOAs were
0, 250, or 500 msec.
To aid the participants in deciding how fast they should respond, we made the dead-
line visible to them via a large animated box that collapsed toward the smaller box that
contained the digit. When the large box reached the digit-box, the participant reached
her deadline and would be “Too Slow.” Participants thus had a visual guide to know how
quickly they should respond.
The tone task was the same as before, except that the animation was now present so that
participants could judge their deadline for the tone task, too.
Mixed Dual-Task Trial Blocks. We fixed the SOA on mixed blocks to be 100 msec,
so the interrupting tone always occurred then. On non-interruption trials, the digit task was
as above, with a SOA of 0, 200, or 400 msec for the easy-digit task (0, 250 or 500 for the
hard-digit task). The payoff was also changed to further emphasize the interrupting tone
task, by making it so that if participants were Too Slow or erroneous on the tone task, they















Figure 3.8. A typical trial on a single-task trial. Note it encourages “deferred mode”
because participants are taught to respond only after the SOA.
points if they responded incorrectly).
3.3.2 Results
Because we are generating so many statistics and comparisons, due to the added manipu-
lation of having three different SOA’s, all analyses were done on the mean of the median
reaction times for each block. One participant was removed from further analyses due to
poor performance on single-task trials of mixed blocks.
Pure-Task Blocks
Digit and Tone Task. Because each digit task had three different SOAs, we will refer
to these as low (for SOA 0), medium (for SOA 200 in the easy-task, SOA 250 for the
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Figure 3.9. Screenshot of typical trial from digit task. Top view shows the start of trial.
Bottom shows what participant sees when deadline is reached. Note that the original color
of surrounding square is green.
hard-task), and high (SOA 400 easy, SOA 500 hard). Unlike in Experiment 1, we found no
evidence that participants were grouping responses, so we did not separate the participants
into different groups. All t-tests were done within subject, so paired t-tests were used.
We first examined our response-selection effect. Table 3.4 summarizes the mean and
standard deviation for each condition. Responses to whole stimuli (stimuli that were not
degraded), at Low-SOA were significantly slower in the hard-digit task (M = 423 msec,
sd = 25.9 msec) than in the easy-digit task (M = 330 msec, sd = 19.2, paired t-test t(6) =
9.18, p < .001). Note that the Low-SOA RT is about 20 msec longer for both the easy and
hard-digit task than in Experiment 1, which may be caused by the participants having to
perceive the go signal. At Mid-SOA, we again found that the RT for the hard-digit task
with a mean of 241 msec was larger than the RT for the easy-digit task with a mean of
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215 msec (t(6) = 5.73, p < .005). Unexpectedly, at High-SOA, there was a difference in
the hard (M = 208) and easy (M = 196) case, t(6) = 3.82, p <.01. We found the same
pattern for degraded stimuli, such that at all three SOAs, response-selection difficulty had
a significant effect (Low-SOA: hard-digit RT of 471 > easy-digit RT of 368, t(6) = 8.48, p
< .001; mid-SOA: hard RT of 266 > easy RT of 235, t(6) = 7.45 p< .001; high-SOA: hard
RT of 209 > easy RT of 194, t(6) = 3.31, p < .02). However, the difficulty effects were
very small in the High-SOA condition.
We next examined whether our degradation had an effect. At Low-SOA, we found a
significant effect for both the easy and hard task. In the easy task, we found that degraded
RT of 368 was significantly greater than the whole RT of 330 msec, t(6) = 5.29, p<.005,
and that in the hard-digit task, the degraded RT of 471 was significantly greater than the
whole RT of 423, t(6) = 5.75, p< .005. At Mid-SOA, we found for the easy-digit task that
degradation still had an effect, degraded RT of 235 was significantly greater than whole RT
of 215, t(6) = 5.93, p< .005, as well as for the hard-digit task, where degraded RT of 266
> whole RT of 241, t(6) = 4.90, p < .005. At High-SOA, we found no degradation effect
for either difficulty level. For the easy-digit task, whole RT of 196 = degraded RT of 194,
t(6) = 0.70, p=ns. For the hard-digit task, whole RT of 208 = degraded RT of 209, t(6) =
0.15, p = ns.
The tone task yielded a mean time of 384 msec, indicating similar performance to that
in Experiment 1.
We also examined “catch” trials, where the participant was never given a “go” signal
and so was not supposed to respond at all. We found that amongst these trials, participants
incorrectly responded on 11.6% of easy, whole trials, and 5.3% of easy, degraded trials.
However, these numbers belie quite a range, from 0.0% of these errors to 29.6% of these
errors in the easy, whole condition for one participant. This seems to indicate a clear
strategic difference, as one participant anticipated more than another. In the hard-digit task
with whole stimuli, participants made 7.9% such errors, and 4.8% in the hard, degraded
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stimuli condition.
Condition (msec) Low-SOA Mid-SOA High-SOA
Whole Easy 330 (19.21) 215 (12.79) 196 (14.51)
Degraded Easy 368 (27.26) 235 (14.44) 194 (12.03)
Whole Hard 423 (25.92) 241 (10.75) 208 (12.06)
Degraded Hard 471 (36.20) 266 (21.61) 209 (20.78)
Tone 384 (30.76) — —
Table 3.4. Results for pure-task blocks.
Mixed-Trial Blocks
Uninterrupted Trials. Table 3.5 shows results from the single-task trials of the Easy-
Digit Mixed-Trial Blocks. There was still a significant response-selection difficulty effect
at SOA 0, such that the hard task took longer for both whole and degraded stimuli (whole
hard RT of 464 msec> whole easy RT of 420 msec, t(6) = 7.07, p<.001; degraded hard RT
of 511 > degraded easy RT of 433, t(6) = 7.00, p< .001). At Mid-SOA, the RT difference
for hard degraded stimuli compared to easy degraded stimuli was marginally significant
(t(6) = 2.00, p=.09), and it was significant at High-SOA (t(6) = 2.45, p< .05). For the
whole stimuli, at Mid-SOA the hard task took significantly longer than the easy task (t(6)
= 2.89, p< .05), while there was no significant difference at High-SOA (t(6) = 1.87, ns).
The degradation effect on RT was no longer significant except in the hard-digit task
at SOA 0 (t(6) = 4.12, p<.001). Even at the Low-SOA for the easy task, the degradation
effect was not significant, t(6)=1.29, p=ns.
Although the degradation effect was greatly reduced, reaction times in these single-task
trials were significantly greater than in the pure blocks. This phenomenon we referred to as
the “uncertainty effect” since it is caused by a participant not being certain a priori whether
the trial will be a single or dual-task trial. This uncertainty effect was significant in all cases
except the High-SOA. For the mixed-blocks uninterrupted whole easy-digit Low-SOA task,





































































Figure 3.10. Comparison of pure and uninterrupted RT for easy-digit task. Top-graph is
at Low-SOA, middle-graph is at Mid-SOA, and bottom-graph is at High-SOA. Note the
different scales.
Mid-SOA uninterrupted RT of 275 > pure whole Med-SOA RT of 215, t(6) = 5.89, p<
.001, although High-SOA mixed-blocks uninterrupted RT of 196 = pure whole High-SOA
RT of 196 t(6) = .01, ns. For the degraded easy-digit task, mixed-blocks degraded Low-
SOA uninterrupted RT of 433 > pure degraded Low-SOA RT of 368, t(6) = 6.44, p<.001,
mixed-blocks degraded Mid-SOA uninterrupted RT of 282 > pure degraded Mid-SOA RT
of 235, t(6) = 6.65, p<.001, and mixed-blocks degraded High-SOA uninterrupted RT of
197 = pure degraded High-SOA RT of 194, t(6) = .84, ns.
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Condition (msec) Low-SOA Med-SOA High-SOA
Whole Easy 420 (40.42) 275 (31.97) 196 (20.18)







Whole Hard 464 (42.40) 295 (23.31) 219 (34.20)







Table 3.5. Results for uninterrupted trials on mixed-trial blocks.
In the whole hard-digit task case, we get a similar pattern. Mixed-blocks whole Low-
SOA uninterrupted RT of 464 > pure whole Low-SOA RT of 423, t(6) = 3.19, p< .02;
mixed-blocks whole Mid-SOA uninterrupted RT of 295> pure whole Mid-SOA RT of 241,
t(6) = 5.89, p<.001, but not at High-SOA, mixed-blocks whole uninterrupted RT of 219 =
pure whole High-SOA RT of 208, t(6) = .87, ns. The same pattern holds for the degraded
stimuli: mixed-blocks degraded Low-SOA uninterrupted RT of 511 > pure degraded Low-
SOA RT of 471, t(6) = 3.74, p< .01, degraded Mid-SOA mixed-blocks uninterrupted RT
of 298 > pure degraded Mid-SOA RT of 266, t(6) = 2.70, p<.05, but again not at High-
SOA, where mixed-blocks degraded High-SOA uninterrupted RT of 213 = pure degraded
High-SOA RT of 209, t(6) = 1.37, ns.
Interrupt Trials. Table 3.6 shows the results from interrupt trials. As is obvious, the
median RT for the tone task was longer on dual-task trials than it was on pure-task trials.
This cost we call the “interrupting lag.” It is clear that degradation had no effect on the
tone-task RT, but it turns out response-selection difficulty did have an effect, i.e. if the
initial digit task was easy, participants responded faster to the tone than if the initial digit
was hard. If we combine easy-whole and easy-degraded tone RTs into one measure (since







































































Figure 3.11. Comparison of pure and uninterrupted RT for easy-digit task. Top-graph is































Figure 3.12. Comparison of tone task from pure blocks and from interrupt trials, depending
on the type of digit task.
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RT (m = 525) is less than for the hard-digit task (M = 568 msec), t(13) = 3.89, p< .005.
Note, though, that this 43 msec difference is less than the 100 msec difference between
pure easy-digit RT and pure hard-digit RT.
Easy-Whole Easy-Degraded Hard-Whole Hard-Degraded
Interrupted Digit-Task
RT
194 (30.77) 195 (31.68) 261 (36.63) 258 (29.68)
Tone-Task RT 528 (91.16) 522 (82.55) 569 (126) 566 (108)
Interrupting Lag 144 139 186 183
Fail to Interrupt (%) 6.82 5.66 1.73 1.73
Table 3.6. Results for interrupted trials on mixed-trial blocks.
We also examined how often participants failed to interrupt by responding to Task 1
before they responded to Task 2. There were relatively few of these errors. Amongst all
dual-task trials, participants failed to interrupt on 6.8% of the trials if Task 1 was the easy-
digit whole-stimuli condition, 5.7% in the easy-digit, degraded-stimuli condition. However,
there was interesting variation between individuals, with a range of 0.00% such errors to
11.96% such errors.
3.3.3 Discussion
Interestingly, the results of Experiment 2 were similar to those of Experiment 1. Partic-
ipants still had significant “uncertainty effects” of around 90 msec for the easy-digit task
and around 40 msec for the hard-digit task. In this case, there was a fixed SOA at 100 msec,
early enough that participants should not have had to wait so long to determine whether it
was a dual-task trial. We also found a similar interrupting lag as in Experiment 1, around
140 msec for the easy-digit task and 180 msec for the hard-digit task.
These results rather surprised us, as we expected that being in deferred mode should
make interruptions much easier, and yet this did not seem to be the case. However, Experi-
ment 2 yielded little evidence of ““groupers” and ““switchers” as in Experiment 1. Almost
all participants took around 100 msec to resume the easy-digit task. One participant seemed
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like a clear grouper, taking 30 msec to resume the easy-digit task (but 110 msec in the hard-
digit task). However, the next fastest participant took 84 msec in the easy-digit task, and
all the other participants had around 100 msec. There were also no clear ““groupers” in the
hard-digit task.
A question that we had from Experiment 1 remains: what is causing the interrupting
lag? Perhaps Experiment 2 still involved a confound. Participants on dual-task trials had
to make two manual responses, so it was possible that there was interference between them
(Peters, 1977; Caroselli et al., 1997). If so, that would create a delay in responding to Task
2, and possibly explain our interruption lag.
The uncertainty effect may also just be caused by manual interference. Participants
in pure blocks can specify their hand before a trial begins, so only one feature needed
to be specified. However, in dual-blocks, participants are not sure with which hand they
have to initially respond, so they now have two features they need to specify. This would
take 100 msec to specify, resulting in a 50 msec “uncertainty effect.” This is similar to
the uncertainty effect in the degraded-easy, whole-hard, and degraded-hard conditions (and
in fact none of these conditions significantly differed from 50, although the whole-easy
uncertainty effect did significantly differ from 50).
In other ways, though, Experiment 2 worked much better than Experiment 1. In Exper-
iment 1, there was a huge range of different strategies in how participants performed. In
Experiment 2, participants seemed to have relatively homogeneous strategies. This makes
the results much easier to interpret.
3.4 Experiment 3
The problem with Experiment 2 is that the interrupting tone task and the original digit task
both required manual key presses. Naturally these must interfere with one another, and this
interference may dwarf any effect of parallel response-selection. To correct this problem,
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we changed the interrupting tone task to be an audio-vocal task with vocal responses. In all
other ways, Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 2.
3.4.1 Method
Participants. Four undergraduate students participated as paid volunteers, none of whom
were in a previous experiment.
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Experimental Design and Procedure. The design and procedure was the same as in
Experiment 2, except that the interrupting tone task involved vocal responses. Participants
heard a tone and had to say “1” “2” or “3” depending on whether the tone was low, medium,
or high-pitched.
3.4.2 Results
One participant was removed from further analyses, due to having an excessively large
tone-task RT on dual-task trials (160 msec more than next nearest participant). Since we
only had three participants remaining, we will not report many t-tests, as we do not expect
them to be significant due to the lack of degrees of freedom.
Pure-Task Blocks
Digit and Tone Task. We again examined our response-selection effect. Table 3.7
summarizes the mean and standard deviation for each different condition. RTs for whole
stimuli (stimuli that were not degraded), at Low-SOA, were significantly slower in the hard-
digit task (M = 398 msec, sd = 60.5 msec) than in the easy-digit task (M = 319 msec, sd =
47.8, paired t-test t(2) = 21.10, p < .005). We found the same result for degraded stimuli,
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t(2) = 14.72, p< .005. At Mid and High-SOA, we did not find a significant RT difference,
but results were consistent with our findings in Experiment 2.
We next examined whether stimulus degradation had an effect, but did not find any
significant differences. However, the trend was similar to that found in Experiment 2, i.e.
degraded stimuli took longer to process than whole stimuli.
The RT for the tone task had a mean of 389 msec, similar to performance in Experiment
2.
We again examined “catch” trials, where the participant was never given a “go” signal
and so was not supposed to respond at all. We found that participants incorrectly responded
on 17.3% of easy whole trials, and 8.6% of easy degraded trials. For the hard-digit task with
whole stimuli, participants made 11.1% catch-trial errors and 9.3% for the hard degraded
stimuli.
Condition (msec) Low-SOA Med-SOA High-SOA
Whole Easy 319 (47.8) 200 (24.7) 180 (11.9)
Degraded Easy 373 (61.9) 225 (37.4) 184 (12.7)
Whole Hard 398 (41.6) 213 (31.5) 190 (16.9)
Degraded Hard 469 (60.5) 240 (42.0) 191 (20.0)
Tone 389 (19.2) — —
Table 3.7. Results for pure-task blocks.
Mixed-Trial Blocks
Uninterrupted Trials. Table 3.8 shows the results from the single-task trials in the
Easy-Digit Mixed-Trial Blocks. The pattern is very similar to what we saw in the pure trial
blocks, as can be seen by the fact that we now have rather small uncertainty effect. Re-
sponse selection was significantly slower for the hard-digit task than for the easy-digit task
in the Low-SOA condition (for whole stimuli, t(2) =10.95, p< .01; for degraded stimuli,
t(2) = 18.94, p< .005).
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Condition (msec) Low-SOA Med-SOA High-SOA
Whole Easy 344 (23.6) 235 (26.2) 183 (14.0)







Whole Hard 422 (28.5) 235 (31.9) 193 (20.00)







Table 3.8. Results for uninterrupted trials on mixed-trial blocks.
The only uncertainty effect that significantly differed from 0 occurred with in the Mid-
SOA for easy whole stimuli, i.e. 235 msec > 200 msec, t(2) = 6.70, p<.03. Of course,
the small sample size means we cannot interpret the null effects of these other effects, but
the trend was for a much greater reduction in the uncertainty effects compared to those in
previous experiments.
Interrupt Trials. Table 3.9 shows the results from interrupt trials. The greater em-
phasis that we placed on the interrupting tone task seemed to have worked, as the interrupt-
ing lag was much lower than in previous experiments. We also found no real difference in
RTs for the tone task across conditions, although there was a marginal difference between
easy-whole and easy-degraded conditions, t(2) = 3.20, p=0.085. The easy-digit tone RT (M
= 388) did not differ from the hard-digit tone RT (M = 403), t(5) = 1.72, p=ns.
We do find a significant effect of task difficulty on interrupted digit-task RT. Combining
easy-whole and easy-degraded RTs compared to hard-whole and hard-degraded RTs, we
found that the easy-digit task interrupted RT of 136 msec < hard-digit task interrupted RT
of 171 msec, t(5) = 4.01, p<.02.
We also examined how often participants failed to interrupt, responding to Task 1 when
they should have responded to Task 2. There were more of these errors than in Experiment
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Easy-Whole Easy-Degraded Hard-Whole Hard-Degraded
Interrupted Digit-Task
RT
139 (61.7) 132 (48.8) 160 (80.1) 181 (56.6)
Tone-Task RT 376 (33.9) 401 (37.7) 396 (25.2) 410 (22.6)
Interrupting Lag -13 13 8 21
Fail to Interrupt (%) 13.91 6.90 5.73 2.44
Table 3.9. Results for interrupted trials on mixed-trial blocks.
2. With whole stimuli in the easy-digit case, participants made these errors on 13.9% of
the trials, compared to 6.9% for degraded stimuli, versus 5.7% for the hard-digit task with
whole stimuli, and 2.4% for the hard-digit task with degraded stimuli.
Computational Modeling. All models were made using CORE, the constraint-based op-
timizing reasoning engine (Howes et al., unpublished manuscript). CORE allows the mod-
eler to disentangle strategy space from architectural constraints. Details of the modeling
are discussed below.
3.4.3 Modeling Results
All models were made using CORE (constraint-based optimizing reasoning engine). All
models were calibrated based on parameters estimated from pure-block results in the Low-
SOA condition only. Models were then made for each subject in each condition. So each
model was fit to six different data sets, each participant’s easy and hard dual-task blocks,
for each of three different participants. All the models used estimates from EPIC (Meyer
& Kieras, 1997a,b) as the bases for the duration of different processes. For example, all of
our models included a time to detect the tone, which we asssumed came from a Gamma
Distribution with a mean of 50 msec. Because only one hand was ever used, we assumed
motor preparation also had a mean time of 50 msec, as well as motor initialization. We
used these assumptions for vocal responses, as well. We assumed a 25 msec mean for the
vocal apparatus to record the response, and a 10 msec mean for the manual apparatus. We
assumed that the easy-digit response selection only took 1 cognitive cycle, whose duration
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came from a Gamma distribution with mean 50. We assumed that the tone task, a com-
patible task, also only took one cycle for selecting a response. For the hard-digit task, we
assumed that it took 2.67 cycles to select the response.1 All the models discussed below
also include an “unlock” process that must be called before Task 1 can be completed. We
used the EPIC assumption that the mean unlocking time is 100 msec (Meyer & Kieras,
1997a, p. 26).
Parameter Estimated Mean (msec)
Motor Preparation (1 feature) 50
Motor Initiation 50
Whole Digit Identification 132
Degraded Digit Identification 193
Easy-Digit Response-Selection (1 cycle) 50
Hard-Digit Response-Selection (2.67 cycles) 133





Working Memory Gating Time 25
Vocal Apparatus 25
Manual Apparatus 10
Table 3.10. Estimated mean times for parameters in models (derived from EPIC, Meyer &
Kieras, 1997a,b).
Models were compared to human data along the following criteria: % Fail to Interrupt,
Tone-Task RT, Interrupted-Digit RT, and Uninterrupted-Digit RT in Low/Medium/High-
SOA conditions. Architectural assumptions will be discussed concerning each individual
model. Models are presented using a program called CogTool (John et al., 2004). To make
comparisons as easy as possible, all models shown below were derived from the same
participant in the same condition, i.e. participant 1 in the easy-digit condition. See 3.11 for
a summary of models.
1This follows from the fact it takes one cycle to respond to the digits 1 - 3, and we assume the digits 4 - 9
are done serially and take a cognitive cycle each. Hence 1/3rd of the time 1 cycle, 2/3rd of the time 3.5 cycles
on average = 1/3 * 1 + 2/3 * 3.5 = 2.67
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Model Architecture Summary Results
Deferment RSB Model with no response-reversal
errors because Task 1 resumes
only after Task 2 completed
Too slow at fitting inter-
rupted RT
Early-Deferment RSB Task 1 proceeds as soon as wait-
time ends if tone not detected; if
tone detected Task 1 proceeds af-
ter Task 2 completed




RSB Task 1 RS occurs as soon as Task
2 RS finished, then proceeds im-
mediately to motor execution




RSB Task 1 RS occurs after unlock
when Task 2 RS finished
Generally good fit
Lock No-RSB Task 1 RS first locked if inter-
ruption detected, then unlocked
after Task 2 RS finished
Interrupted Digit Task
too slow
Motor Unlock No-RSB Motor Prep. begins locked for
Task 1, unlocked after RS for
Task 2 finished
Generally good fit
Table 3.11. Summary of computational models, RS=response selection, RSB = response-
selection bottleneck.
Deferment Models. In these models we assume that there is a response-selection
bottleneck, so response selection can only occur for one task at a time. A visualization
of an interrupt trial from our first model is shown in Figure 3.13. The grey boxes are
associated with processes for Task 2, the tone task, and the black boxes are processes
associated with Task 1, the digit task. The scale above shows the time in seconds. If we
follow the path along the grey boxes, we see an initial SOA of 100 msec, which is when the
tone would occur on a dual-task trial. Then we have to detect and identify the tone. Tone
identification occurs in the bottom row, tone detection occurs in the grey box right above
it. After perception, the participant immediately proceeds to response selection, and then
proceeds to motor preparation, motor initiation and then apparatus-recording time. So in
this model, there is no delay in performing Task 2, as all of these stages also have to occur
on pure-tone trials. Hence the interrupting lag should be 0.
The black boxes are associated with processes for Task 1. At time 0, two black boxes
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begin: Wait-for-task and perceive. Perceive is the process to identify the digit. Note that
perception can occur in parallel, so although we see the grey box associated with tone
detection in-between the two black boxes, that is occurring simultaneously with digit iden-
tification. Wait-for-task is a participant’s mental waiting time before beginning response
selection for Task 1. A participant has to be worried that if she begins response selection
for Task 1, and then has to do response selection for Task 2, this may result in a significant
delay. Hence if participants have not yet detected any “go” signal, they will wait some time
before they begin to select a response for Task 1. If participants do not wait long enough,
then they will begin response selection for Task 1 as soon as digit perception is completed,
resulting in a delay in Task 2 if they then detect the tone. If, as in Figure 3.13, tone de-
tection occurs before wait-for-task is complete, then participants do response selection for
Task 2 first. The mean duration of wait-for-task is varied across strategies, ranging from
150 msec to 350 msec. Note that if participants get the “go” signal before wait-for-task is
completed, then they know it is a single-task trial, and they will proceed to Task 1 response
selection as soon as they finish digit identification.
After Task 2 response selection is completed, this model ensures it will not make an
response-reversal error2, by waiting until the motor initialization has been completed for
Task 2, and only after a deferment will Task 1 resume being processed. The durations of
these “defer” times also are strategically varied, from 1 to 25 to 50 msec. After the defer
time has ended, Task 1 motor processes are unlocked, and then Task 1 response is made.
In our “early-deferment” model, when the wait-for-task process is not long enough,
then no deferment or unlocking for Task 1 is needed, and a response reversal is likely.
Figure 3.14 shows a trial where the modified model makes a response reversal. Here, the
black boxes associated with Task 1 for motor preparation and initiation occur before the
corresponding grey boxes associated with Task 2. We made this change because almost all
human participants in all conditions had some response-reversal errors (except for one par-
2Response-reversal errors could equally well be considered as fail-to-interrupt or, as in Chapter 2, order
errors
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Figure 3.13. Visualization of “deferment” model, easy-digit condition.
ticipant in the “hard-digit” condition), so we felt it necessary that our model could produce
these as well.
Our CORE models automatically compared these different strategies, and found out
which ones were optimal in terms of maximizing points earned per trial. With this version
of “defer” the same strategies were chosen as optimal for all participants in all conditions:
a long wait time (300 or 350 msec, there was no difference in these strategies), and “defer”
duration did not matter, except in one case where the long duration was suboptimal. Since
all the other strategies were equally optimal, we will examine the strategy with a 300 msec
wait-for-task time and a 1 msec mean duration for defer.
Our model at this time predicts no response-reversal errors. Table 3.12 shows a com-
parison of the model and human results. Note that the human data was calculated a bit
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Figure 3.14. Visualization of “early-deferment” model response-reversal error, easy-digit
condition.
99
differently than above, to make it more directly comparable with the model data.3
Human Easy Model Easy Human Hard Model Hard
Interrupted Digit-Task
RT
159 191 195 231
Tone-Task RT 403 385 437 388
Response-Reversal Er-
rors (%)
10.42 0.77 4.11 0.03
Whole Single-Task Tri-
als, SOA low
349 316 418 387
Degraded Single-Task
Trials, SOA low
398 376 461 468
Whole Single-Task Tri-
als, SOA med
240 170 244 215
Degraded Single-Task
Trials, SOA med
253 196 263 242
Whole Single-Task Tri-
als, SOA high
181 159 210 161
Degraded Single-Task
Trials, SOA high
186 155 194 165
Table 3.12. Comparison of human data and “Deferment” model results for mixed-trial
blocks.
Many differences leap out in this comparison. First of all, the optimal strategy makes
very few response-reversal errors. Note that some of the suboptimal strategies do make
more response-reversal errors, however otherwise they tend to have the same problems as
this optimal strategy. The fit for the tone task is better in the easy-digit condition than in
the hard-digit condition, because our model’s tone-task RT is not affected by the difficulty
of the digit condition, whereas our participants were slower in doing the tone task in the
hard-digit condition than in the easy-digit condition. For all three participants there was
a significant difference between the model and actual tone-task RT in the hard-digit case.
The model is also too slow on the interrupted trials. Hence the dual-task fit is significantly
off. On uninterrupted trials, the model is too fast at High-SOA and at Mid-SOA. The model
does a much better job at the Low-SOA (note that although the model differs by 20 or 30
3We did not examine results by block, as we did above, because the model did not generate data by block;
we also compared distributions and there would not have been enough trials per block to do this
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msec often on average, there is more noise in these distributions, so these differences are
often not statistically significant).
We first modeled “deferment” strategies because some models of the PRP task used de-
ferment strategies to prevent response-reversal errors (Howes et al., unpublished manuscript).
However, the defer model makes too few of these errors and takes too long to resume
the interrupted digit task. The fact that “deferment” is involved in both of the ill-fitting
models discussed above indicates human do not use a “deferment” strategy. Note that if
we assumed a no-bottleneck architecture, we would still have these problems. Hence the
next strategy we will consider is a “no-deferment” model. Given our instructions did not
particularly emphasize preventing response-reversal errors, we felt it was reasonable that
participants would adopt a simpler strategy that resulted in faster overall performance, but
at the risk of making more of these types of errors. Figure 3.15 shows a visualization of an
interrupt trial from the model.
Under this model, Task 1 begins every trial with response selection locked. It is un-
locked as soon as it gets a control signal, either from response selection finishing in Task 2
or if wait-for-task finishes before the tone is detected. Note that due to variance, at times
unlock and the motor processes associated with Task 1 could finish before the motor pro-
cesses associated with Task 2, although this is rare. As in our previous model, we find that
optimal strategy is to wait 300 or 350 msec (although for most participants and conditions,
250 was also optimal). In Table 3.13 we compare the results from an optimal strategy of
waiting 300 msec with human data. This model is a much better fit on the single-task trials
than the previous model, and virtually every statistic is closer to the human data than the
previous model, and it is more parsimonious, using only a parameter for mean wait-time
compared to two parameters (for mean defer-time and mean wait-time) in the previous
model.
Although this is arguably our best model (it is arguable because some models fit best
for an individual participant in a particular condition, but not overall), there is still some
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Figure 3.15. Visualization of “no-deferment” model, easy-digit condition.
things that need to be improved. Namely, the tone-task RT in the model does not vary if we
use the easy or hard-digit task as Task 1, but it does vary in the human data. In most other
ways, though, this model is a good fit. We have also tried a few other variations of this
no-deferment model. In one, we did not “unlock” Task 1 response selection, we just had it
immediately follow Task 2 response selection. This model did a very poor job of fitting the
data, giving strong support to the AEC notion of “unlock.”
We also did a variation of our “no-deferment” model where there was no structural
response-selection bottleneck, i.e. two responses could be selected simultaneously. In this
case, Task 1 motorprep was initially locked at the start of every trial. If wait-for-task fin-
ished before the tone was detected, then “unlock” immediately proceeded, simultaneously
with response-selection for Task 1. As soon as unlock and Task 1 response selection were
finished, motor preparation began. Note that for Task 2, no process began the trial “locked”
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subject 2 strategy 3 easy  trials task 2 density function




































subject 2 strategy 4 easy  trials task 2 density function























Figure 3.16. Density plot of tone-task RT on interrupt trials on mixed-trial blocks for a












159 139 195 220
Tone-Task RT 403 386 437 390
Order-Errors (%) 10.42 1.54 4.11 0.52
Whole Single-Task Tri-
als, SOA low
349 322 418 405
Degraded Single-Task
Trials, SOA low
398 369 461 458
Whole Single-Task Tri-
als, SOA med
240 191 244 270
Degraded Single-Task
Trials, SOA med
253 218 263 277
Whole Single-Task Tri-
als, SOA high
181 184 210 177
Degraded Single-Task
Trials, SOA high
186 186 194 184
Table 3.13. Comparison of human data and “No-Deferment” model results for mixed-trial
blocks.
so no unlock was needed. Hence Task 2 response selection immediately followed Task 2
perception, and motor preparation immediately followed response selection. If the tone
was detected before wait-for-task was finished, then “unlock” began immediately follow-
ing Task 2 response selection. Hence, on these trials, Task 1 motor preparation processes
began about 100 msec after Task 2 motor preparation began. However, these models were
too fast on average, predicting interrupted RT should all be around 100 msec, regardless of
the difficulty of the digit task. These models were also too fast for the uninterrupted trials
and for the tone task. However, this model was a better fit than the standard “no-deferment”
for one participant.
We also made one model that did not begin in deferred mode. Only if the tone was
detected before the wait for it was over would Task 1 response selection then be “locked,”
a process that took 50 msec on average. After locking, Task 1 response selection would
be “unlocked” after Task 2 response selection was complete. This model was a poor fit for
every participant.
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subject 2 easy interrupted task 1 density function
average strategy 1 payoff 73.5
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subject 2 easy interrupted task 1 density function
average strategy 2 payoff 125.5
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subject 2 easy interrupted task 1 density function
average strategy 3 payoff 161.6
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subject 2 easy interrupted task 1 density function
average strategy 4 payoff 165.2




















Subj Inter Task 1
Figure 3.17. Density plot of interrupted easy-digit RT on interrupt trials on mixed-trial
blocks for a particular subject across strategies compared to No-Deferment/Unlock model.
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3.4.4 Discussion
In Experiment 3, we developed a way to get people to successfully interrupt. By ensuring
there was no motor interference, the uncertainty effects that concerned us in Experiment 2
largely went away. More importantly, the interrupting lag also largely disappeared, indi-
cating participants could do the interrupting task as quickly as they could do that task by
itself, which is important given the payoff we gave participants emphasizing this.
Modeling the experimental results in CORE was quite illuminating. First of all, we
found that a very parsimonious model was our best-fitting model. This model required us to
assume that participants began each trial with response selection locked at the start of each
trial, similar to the conservative strategy from the adaptative executive control (AEC) model
(Meyer et al., 1995; Schumacher et al., 1999). By unlocking response selection for Task 1
depending on a wait time and Task 2 processes, we created a reasonable approximation of
all participants’ results.
However, in some ways our model was still lacking, and that helps us realize what we
still need to work on in understanding how people interrupt. For example, in our models
the tone-task RT was the same if performed in an easy-interrupt or a hard-interrupt block,
i.e. the difficulty of the initial digit task did not affect performance of the interrupting tone
task. Participants, though, were 40 msec slower when performing the tone task during hard-
interrupt blocks than during easy-interrupt blocks. However, with only three participants
in this experiment, we need more data to see just how robust this finding is.
We also examined optimal strategies in each of our models, and found that most optimal
strategies had fewer response-reversal errors than humans made. In fact, optimal strategies
that maximized points per trial for a given model found there were no response-reversal
errors. Because participants were making these errors, the model strategies that best fit
human data were suboptimal strategies. Figure 3.18 shows a plot of uninterrupted RT
by SOA, and how the optimal strategy is not a particularly good fit, whereas one of the
suboptimal strategies fits the data much better. It is unclear if participants were choosing a
106







































Figure 3.18. Plot of easy-digit RT by SOA for uninterrupted trials on mixed-trial blocks
for a particular subject; note that maximum points represents the optimal strategy for No-
Deferment/Unlock model, and is a poor fit to the human data, whereas a suboptimal strategy
is a good fit to the human data.
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suboptimal strategy, if there is some cognitive constraint preventing optimal performance,
or if there is some other factor contributing to these response-reversal errors not addressed
in our models.
3.5 General Discussion
To return to our example from the introduction, if a pilot is jarred from his flying duties
by an alarm, we have learned is that it is possible to train the pilot to deal with the inter-
ruption quickly. However, it does not seem possible to deal with the alarm if the pilot was
in immediate mode on the previous task. In Experiment 1, we learned how debilitating
an interruption is when trying to do the initial task as quickly as possible. Interruptions
force you to lose the previous progress you made on that initial task, and participants find
it difficult to stop progress in the initial task. We found a much larger interrupting lag
than that predicted by EPIC assumptions, which assume merely a 50 msec mean cost in
order to remove the goal for Task 1 from memory. So it appears trickier to interrupt than
straightforward analyses of cognitive architectures would predict.
It is worth nothing that interruptions were very stressful for our participants. Once
we trained participants to do a task as quickly as possible, it was clear they did not feel
natural interrupting that task. Quite a few participants referred to it as the most difficult
experiment they had ever done. As such, it was very interesting to learn what strategies
they were exploring, as some of the strategies seemed to be based on the goal of relieving
their stress level rather than on maximizing their points. As such, we had to use many
different methods just to help participants get more comfortable with the task and accept
the fact that they were not able to interrupt 100% of the time. In Experiment 1, we think
we made participants try as hard as possible to maximize their points, but the stressfulness
of the task, even after three sessions of training, means that we cannot entirely discount
the possibility that they may have adopted suboptimal strategies that were less cognitively-
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demanding.
These other sub-goals may explain in part why we found so many different strate-
gies amongst our participants. Although we do not have records of the ethnicity of the
participants in Experiment 1, it would be interesting to see if there were cultural differ-
ences amongst the participants. As we will see in Chapter 4, it is possible that Western
participants favor strategies that require switching, but that East Asian participants prefer
strategies that require grouping because then the two tasks may be done relatively simulta-
neously.
Experiments 2 and 3 were far less stressful for our participants, as we had trained them
to perform Task 1 in deferred mode. In this mode, response selection goes to working
memory, instead of directly to motor processors, allowing a natural interruption point. In-
terestingly, Experiment 2 had rather similar results as in Experiment 1, with the notable
exception that the range of strategies was much more constrained. This allowed us to begin
to look at participants as a group, not just as a collection of subgroups.
We realized to best interpret the results, we had to first remove other sources of inter-
ference, which we did by making the responses in different modalities in Experiment 3.
The results of that experiment seemed quite meaningful and interpretable, so we modeled
performance using CORE. We found the best overall model to be one that assumed that
each trial began with response selection for Task 1 locked, and only unlocked after Task
2 response selection was completed or after the participant’s internal clock told them they
had waited long enough to see if it was a dual-task trial or not.
Hence for our pilot having to deal efficiently with an alarm, we had better hope a vocal-
response is required, and that he was in deferred-mode originally. This may also be part of
the reason that we have copilots on flights, as one pilot could always be doing a task that
allows them to remain in deferred mode while the other is in immediate mode, allowing
one pilot to always be able to deal with emergency interruptions that occur.
Our paradigm and results are a form of multitasking not heavily studied, with poten-
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tially broad implications. The Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) studies have been
heavily used to study the existence of a response-selection bottleneck (RSB). Unfortu-
nately, as our modeling shows, our results are not conclusive one way or the other con-
cerning whether a RSB exists or not. Although our results were certainly consistent with
there being a RSB, because our best model only had one response selected at a time, in
fact we think our model better supports the Meyer et al. (1995) model of Adaptive Execu-
tive Control. One participant had his Interrupted-Digit RT fit better via the no-bottleneck
model than the bottleneck model (this participant had 100 msec RTs for the interrupted-
digit task in both the easy and hard-digit case). Because we only had a few participants in
this experiment, concern about over-fitting means we wanted to use the model that fit all of
the participants best overall. But this result at least tentatively supports the AEC model of
different strategies used in multitasking.
One concern in our study is that the “go” signal on single-task trials was visual, so
that may result in some interference with processing the stimuli. Plus, the color of our
visual go-signal indicated if the participant had to do Task 1 or Task 2. But because the
go-signal involved motion, participants may have detected the motion before they detected
the color of the signal. This may have resulted in more response-reversal errors than our
model would predict, as a participant may interpret the motion as the go-signal for Task 1.
Because our model does not consider perceiving color and motion separately, this may be
why our optimal strategies underestimate the number of response-reversal errors.
Because there are so few studies in task-interruptions, the results here are rather tenta-
tive. More research is needed: how does training affect performance, what if Task 1 has
a vocal response and Task 2 a manual response, do we need to encourage participants to
explore the strategy space more? Will there be an “Anti-PRP” effect where the lower the
SOA, the less interference in Task 1 and Task 2?
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Chapter 4
Cultural Differences in Multi-Tasking
4.1 Introduction
The movie Pushing Tin featured two rival air-traffic controllers competing to see who was
the better controller. One of these controllers, Nick Falzone, was an American who was the
best at processing all the information needed to guide planes, and was shown in the movie
switching between processing and relaying information for one plane and then rapidly
proceeding to the next. This sequential strategy made him the best controller, until the
newly-hired rival controller, Russell Bell, proceeded to outshine Nick as a controller. Rus-
sell was half-Choctaw Native American, so he was likely raised in a different culture than
Nick. Choctaw culture, like most Native-American cultures, is considered more collec-
tivistic than European-American culture, which is considered individualistic. Could this
cultural influence have aided Russell in his career pursuit, influencing him to choose differ-
ent, more simultaneous multitasking strategies, garnering him an advantage as an air-traffic
controller? Although the movie did not delve into these issues, this chapter documents how
people’s socio-cultural milieu influences people’s multitasking strategies.
Is there reason to believe that culture could influence how people choose to multitask?
Research has demonstrated that cognitive processes can be modified, sometimes dramati-
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cally, by socio-cultural contexts in which people are engaged. For example, Polk & Farah
(1998) found that Canadian postal workers who often read zip codes with both letters and
numbers had different performance on visual-search tasks than normal controls that pri-
marily read numbers and letters in separate contexts. More generally, research has demon-
strated that cognitive and attentional characteristics of people vary widely as a function of
largely demarcated cultural contexts such as West and East (Kitayama et al., 2008; Nis-
bett, 2003). The current work seeks to contribute to this emerging literature by examining
whether individuals with different cultural backgrounds vary in their strategies to perform
two complex sensory discrimination tasks.
Over the last two decades, it has been proposed that whereas practices and meanings of
Western cultural contexts emphasize the independence and separatedness of each distinct
individual, those of East Asian cultural contexts highlight the interdependence and connect-
edness of people constituting a social group (Kitayama et al., 2008; Markus & Kitayama,
1991; Triandis, 1995; Shweder & Bourne, 1982). They have also argued that these differ-
ent cultural contexts entail certain cognitive consequences. In particular, by engaging in
the Western independent practices and meanings, individuals may become more attentive
to each distinct individual and draw inferences about him or her while giving only scant
attention to the social surrounding. In contrast, by engaging in the Eastern, interdependent
practices and meanings, individuals may become more attentive holistically to the entire
context in which the target person is embedded. In support of this analysis, numerous stud-
ies have shown that when asked to explain another person’s behavior, people from Western
contexts are more likely than those from Eastern contexts to refer to dispositional (e.g., the
protagonist’s personality or attitude) rather than situational factors (e.g., social atmosphere
and norms; Kitayama et al., 2006; Morris & Peng, 1994; Nisbett et al., 2001).
More recently, it has become evident that the cognitive consequences of culture are
not limited to the domains of social perception and social inference. In fact, analogous
cross-cultural differences in attention have been shown even when the stimulus at issue
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is entirely non-social (Nisbett & Masuda, 2003). For example, Masuda & Nisbett (2001)
had Japanese and American participants watch 10 videos of a clear focal fish swimming
in a virtual aquarium, replete with background fish and scenery. Participants were then
given a recognition memory task either of the focal fish or a novel fish with the previously-
seen background, no background, or a novel background. Americans were only influenced
by the focal fish; the background made no difference in performance. The Japanese, in
contrast, made more errors when the background was different than in the original video.
The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that compared to Americans, Japanese are
more holistic, with attention distributed over the whole scene, to the extent that people from
the two cultures appear to even look at images differently (Chua et al., 2005).
Fish can still be interpreted in anthropomorphic terms. Yet, Kitayama, Duffy, Kawa-
mura, and Larsen (2003) have shown a similar cross-cultural difference in attentional allo-
cation with purely geometric stimuli. Participants were presented with a frame with a line
printed in it. They were then shown another frame of different size. With this Framed Line
Test (FLT), the researchers found that Americans performed better when asked to draw a
line of the exact length in the second frame than to draw a proportional line, suggesting
that their attention is narrowly focused on the goal object - namely, the line. In contrast,
Japanese performed better when asked to draw a proportional line than to draw the exact
line, indicating that their attention is more holistically allocated to both the goal object (the
line) and its surrounding frame. More recently, Hedden, Ketay, and Aron (2008) used a
modified version of the FLT and measured brain activations via fMRI. They found a signif-
icant frontal activation when Caucasian Americans engaged in the relative judgment that
was made very difficult (relative to when the judgment was easy). Conversely, Asian Amer-
icans showed a similar frontal activation when they engaged in the absolute judgment that
is made difficult (relative to when the judgment was kept easy). This suggests that individ-
uals needed to actively regulate their attention when performing a task that was culturally
incongruous.
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Extending these previous studies, our research examines cross-cultural differences in
multitasking with perceptual-motor and cognitive tasks that involve several information-
processing stages: stimulus encoding, perceptual discrimination, response selection, and
movement production (Meyer et al., 1988; Sternberg, 1969a). In the three experiments that
follow, we have tested participants from Western individualistic and Eastern collectivist so-
cieties. In experiments 1 and 2, these participants must perform two concurrent tasks while
trying to schedule processing stages for each task so as to complete them as quickly and
accurately as possible. In these experiments, performing two tasks optimally would require
participants to minimize total costs, to process the two tasks as simultaneously as possible.
However, if it is not possible for an individual to process both tasks simultaneously with no
costs1, then a new optimal strategy may be to process one task as quickly as possible, and
then proceed to the other task. This would result in the minimum cost of the two tasks being
as small as possible, but having a relatively large maximum cost on a trial. In experiment
3, participants have to switch between two tasks, but only respond to one task on a given
trial, so optimal performance would require participants to be able to switch between two
tasks while minimizing any associated cost (Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999;
Rubinstein et al., 2001).
These studies help answer fundamental questions about the diversity of human informa-
tion processing, the heterogeneity of people’s cognitive architectures, and the adaptability
of their task-scheduling strategies (cf. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a,b, 1999; Welford, 1952). Do
people from individualistic and collectivist societies all have a common structural cogni-
tive bottleneck? To what extent may they adopt different strategic modes of multitasking?
Are members of some cultures more prone than others to select responses and produce
movements simultaneously for multiple tasks?
To obtain answers, we have used a procedure first introduced by Schumacher et al.
1These individual differences may be caused by different architectures across individuals, such as some
individuals having a response-selection bottleneck and others not. However, another explanation is that
perceptual times vary across individuals, resulting in different probabilities for response selection for the
two tasks overlapping
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(2001). It requires participants to perform visual-manual and auditory-vocal discrimination
tasks quickly and accurately under both single-task and dual-task conditions. On dual-task
trials, which are designed to encourage “perfect time-sharing,” both tasks must be per-
formed concurrently with equally high priority, whereas on single-task trials, only one task
must be performed. By comparing reaction times (RTs) and error rates (ERs) from the two
trial types, measures of dual-task performance costs are derived, and inferences are made
about how participants cope with the challenging demands of this procedure. Specifically,
we may discover systematic cross-cultural differences in participantsąŕ preferred strategies
of task scheduling, and assess to what extent parallel or serial processing is manifested by
members of one culture (e.g., East Asians) versus another (e.g., North Americans).
We predicted that in Experiments 1 and 2 East Asians would exhibit a tendency toward
“parallel” strategies, where they process the two tasks as simultaneously as possible. West-
erners, in contrast, favor a sequential strategy where they first processed one task and then
the other. Hence East Asians should have less total dual-task costs, and a lower maximum
cost. In Experiment 3, we predicted that because Americans tend to favor sequential strate-
gies, they should have more experience and thus be better at switching at tasks and thus
have less switch-costs. Results were largely consistent with our hypotheses.
4.2 Experiment 1
4.2.1 Method
Participants. Thirty-two Japanese students at Kyoto University and 26 European-American
(American students of European descent) students at the University of Michigan partici-
pated as paid volunteers. Participants were closely matched on several ancillary factors
(e.g., age, educational level, scholastic aptitude, and SES). They received payments for
participation and earned monetary bonuses for good performance.
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Apparatus. Visual stimuli were presented on the display screen of a 17-inch Sony Trini-
tron monitor connected to a Pentium personal computer. The monitor and computer were
of the same builds in Japan and the US. Participants sat about 80 cm from the monitor in a
quiet room. Responses were made with a piano-type response keyboard. It had two groups
of three finger keys, with one group for each hand. The experiment was controlled by a
program written in E-prime.
Experimental Design. Each participant was tested during two sessions on successive
days. A session included 24 trial blocks, divided into 8 consecutive ”epochs” with 4 blocks
per epoch. In each epoch, the first block contained auditory-vocal (AV) single-task trials,
the second block contained visual-manual (VM) single-task trials, and the third and fourth
blocks contained dual-task trials involving both tasks. There were 24 single-task or dual-
task trials per block. During each block, all relevant stimulus-response (S-R) pairs occurred
equally often in random order.
For the VM task, 4 S-R pairs were included. Their stimuli each had three dashes and
a capital ”O”, forming either the stimulus O - - -, - O - -, - - O -, or - - - O. In response to
these stimuli, respectively, the participant pressed one or another of 4 keys with either the
right-hand ring, index, little, or middle finger (cf. Fitts & Seeger, 1953). For the AV task,
3 S-R pairs were included. Their stimuli were tones having frequencies of 196, 880, and
3520 Hz. The responses paired respectively with these stimuli were the spoken digits “1”,
“2”, and “3”.
During each dual-task trial block, all possible combinations of one S-R pair from the
AV task and one S-R pair from the VM task occurred at least once in random order.
Procedure. For each AV single-task trial, an initial 500 msec warning signal with 4 hor-
izontal dashes appeared on the video display. Next, a 40 msec stimulus tone occurred. The
participant responded by saying the digit that had to be paired with the stimulus, and RT
was measured. An experimenter scored the response as being correct or incorrect. Then
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the participant received 500 msec of visual feedback about response accuracy and bonus












Task 1 Reaction Time
Task 2 Reaction Time
Figure 4.1. Timeline for a typical dual-task trial in a time-sharing study. Note that Task 1
and Task 2 are arbitrary designations, as both begin at the same time.
Each VM single-task trial started like those with the AV task. After the visual warning
signal, one of its 4 dashes changed into a capital “O”, presenting a 250 msec VM-task
stimulus. The participant responded by pressing the finger key that had to be paired with
the stimulus. Then there was 1000 msec of post-response visual feedback.
Each dual-task trial combined events from the AV and VM single-task trials. Stimuli
for the two tasks occurred simultaneously after the initial warning signal. Participants re-
sponded to both stimuli as best possible. Following the responses, feedback was presented
about the accuracy and points earned for both tasks.
In addition, participants received visual feedback after every trial block. It summarized
their performance on the block, including total correct responses, mean RTs, number of
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”too slow” responses, and points earned for each task. Participants were instructed to
maximize their bonus points and monetary rewards.
4.2.2 Results
Outlier Removal. Outliers were removed based on bits transmitted per second. This is a
measure that combines speed and accuracy into one statistic. We calculated bits transmit-
ted per second for each participant in each task. Participants were removed based on the
difference in bits transmitted per second in dual-task compared to how the participant per-
formed in the single-task case. Participants who were more than 2.33 standard deviations
(i.e. 1% of the time) away from the mean of their culture were eliminated this way. Partic-
ipants were eliminated in this manner because this was the only way to interpret dual-task
performance. Three Japanese and two American participants were eliminated this way and
removed from future analyses.






















Table 4.1. Comparison of mean RTs across cultures
Reaction Times. On average, RTs for the AV and VM tasks were approximately equal
(M = 548 and 556 msec, respectively); F(1, 51) = 0.58, p > 0.4. Dual-task trials yielded
reliably longer RTs (M = 632 msec) than did single-task trials (M = 471 msec); F(1, 51) =
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103.2, p < 0.001. The dual-task time cost (DTTC; i.e., dual-task minus single-task RTs)
was higher for the AV (M = 184 msec) than VM (M = 138) task; F(1, 51) = 8.65, p <
0.01. However, supporting our initial hypothesis, Japanese participants had reliably lower
DTTCs (M = 125 msec) than did Americans (M = 195 msec); F(1, 51) = 4.51, p < 0.05.
Lower Japanese DTTCs occurred for both tasks: the triple interaction involving task, trial
type, and culture was unreliable; F(1, 51) = 0.47, p > 0.4.
This pattern prevailed throughout Session 2 (Figure 4.2). Mean RTs decreased reliably
across trial-block epochs; F(6, 306) = 26.6, p < 0.001. So did DTTCs; F(6, 306) = 5.06, p
< 0.001. Yet none of these trends interacted with the cultural factor (p > 0.5 in all cases).
We also examined the maximum and minimum cost on each trial, regardless of on
which task. As predicted, Americans had larger maximum costs, M=270 msec, compared
to Japanese, M=179 msec, t(51) = 2.02, p<.05. The minimum cost on each trial did not
differ across cultures, Americans: 85 msec, Japanese: 61 msec, t(51) = 1.17, p=ns.
Error Rates. ERs were generally low (M = 5.4%) and decreased with practice; F(6, 306)
= 2.13, p = 0.05. Fewer errors occurred on single-task (M = 4.4%) than dual-task (M
= 6.4%) trials; F(1, 51) = 52.2, p < 0.001. However, the practice effect was greater for
dual-task trials; F(6, 306) = 2.11, p = 0.05. Americans committed slightly more errors (M
= 5.8%) than did Japanese (M = 4.9%), but this difference was not reliable; F(1, 51) =
0.37, p = 0.5. Nor did the cultural factor interact with other effects on ERs. Thus, major
speed-accuracy tradeoffs did not contribute to the observed pattern of mean RTs (Pachella,
1974).
Cross-Cultural Clustering of DTTCs. To help further interpret the observed cross-
cultural differences between DTCCs, we performed a partitioning-around-medoids (PAM;
Kaufman & Rousseuw, 1990) clustering of individual participants’ data. Figure 4.3 shows
the results of the cluster. Initially we found that two clusters fit the data best, as can be
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Figure 4.2. RTs by block
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Figure 4.3. Cluster and sub-clusters of individual participants
ture significantly differed, χ2(1) = 5.03, p < .05. Participants in the large circle were
basically those who had the most trouble with the task, so were not particularly theoreti-
cally interesting, but this significant difference indicates there was more variability in the
American population than in the Japanese population. The second cluster (those partici-
pants within the dotted lines) were those participants who were capable at the task and so
had reason to strategize. We re-clustered based just on those participants. Each of these
sub-clusters is circled in Figure 4.3. There was no longer a cultural difference in these
sub-clusters χ2(2) = 1.49, p = ns. However, note that the three sub-clusters do seem to
exhibit strategic differences. One cluster seems to have low costs in both tasks, consistent
with performing both tasks in parallel. The other two clusters have low costs in one task,
but larger costs in the other task, consistent with doing the tasks sequentially.
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Points. We also examined how many points were earned by participants from each cul-
ture. Japanese earned on averaged 61,993 points, marginally more than the American av-
erage of 53,846 points, t(51) = 1.86, p=.069. However, when we only examine results
from the sub-clusters, we find the American mean of 63,800 points did not differ from the
Japanese mean of 66,265 points (t(32) = 0.46, p=ns).
4.2.3 Discussion
Our results provide new insights about cross-cultural differences in cognition and perfor-
mance. Previously, it has been established (e.g. Kitayama et al., 2003) that while making
unspeeded perceptual judgments, members of collectivist societies distribute their atten-
tion more broadly than do members of individualistic societies. We have found that this
propensity for distributed ”attention to perception” is complemented by distributed ”atten-
tion to action” during speeded multitasking. The lower DTTCs of Japanese participants
suggest that they more strongly prefer and/or can better implement task-scheduling strate-
gies whereby response selection and movement production occur simultaneously for multi-
ple tasks. Such parallelism further manifests the diversity of human information processing
and the flexible use of people’s cognitive architectures (cf. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a,b, 1999).
That this diversity and flexibility arise even in performing basic choice-reaction tasks illus-
trates the power of cultural factors to extend well beyond routine social situations.
4.3 Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we generalized the procedure of Experiment 1, using another type of
choice-RT task: color identification. We chose a color-identification task because there
was no reason to think color identification should vary across cultures, whereas a spatial
task could use different strategies even at a perceptual stage. For example, a person could
choose to perceive the 0 and three dashes as a spatial task depending on the location of the
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0, or they could group the 0 and three dashes into a single stimulus object, and thus press a
key depending on which of four stimuli they perceive.
4.3.1 Method
Participants. Twenty-four Japanese and 23 European-American university students par-
ticipated as paid volunteers. None had been in Experiment 1. The same payment scheme
was used again. One Japanese participant had a computer malfunction during Session 2, so
her data was never analyzed.
Apparatus, Design and Procedure. The apparatus, design, and procedure were as be-
fore except that, for the VM task, each test stimulus was a disc colored green, yellow, blue,
or red. In response, participants pressed either a right-hand index, middle, ring, or little
finger key, respectively.
4.3.2 Results
Outlier Removal. Outliers were removed based on bits transmitted per second, as in
Experiment 1. One American and one Japanese participant were removed from further
analyses.
Mean RTs and Error Rates appear in Table 4.2 for each trial type, task, and participant
group.
Reaction Times. On average, RTs for the AV and VM tasks were approximately equal
(M = 496 and 492 msec, respectively); F(1, 41) = 0.07, p > 0.5. Dual-task trials yielded
reliably longer RTs (M = 566 msec) than did single-task trials (M = 422 msec); F(1, 41)
= 165.0, p < 0.001. The DTTC was slightly but not reliably higher for the VM task (M
= 150 msec) than AV task (M = 138); F(1, 41) = 0.36, p > 0.5. Again, supporting our






















Table 4.2. Comparison of mean RTs across cultures
did Americans (M = 166 msec); F(1, 41) = 3.91, t(41) = 1.98, p < 0.05, one-tailed. Lower
Japanese DTTCs occurred for both tasks: the triple interaction involving task, trial type,
and culture was unreliable; F(1, 41) = 0.83, p > 0.3. As in Experiment 1 (Figure 4.4), the
pattern of Experiment 2’s results prevailed during all of Session 2. Mean RTs decreased
reliably across trial-block epochs; F(6, 246) = 16.0, p < 0.001. So did DTTCs; F(6, 246) =
5.85, p < 0.001. Yet none of these trends interacted with the cultural group factor (p > 0.2
in all cases).
We also examined the maximum cost on a given trial, regardless of which task. Ameri-
cans, as expected, had significantly larger average maximum cost, M=240 msec, compared
to the Japanese cost of 170 msec, t(41) = 2.11, p<.05. As a sanity check, we also examined
average minimum cost, regardless of task, which we did not expect to differ. Americans
averaged 71 msec, Japanese 68 msec (t(41) = 0.14, p>.5).
Error Rates. ERs were generally low (M = 5.4%). Fewer errors occurred on single-task
trials (M = 4.8%) than dual-task trials (M = 6.0%); F(1, 41) = 72.1, p < 0.001. Americans
committed slightly more errors (M = 5.5%) than did Japanese (M = 5.3%), but this differ-
ence was not reliable; F(1,41) = 0.58, p > 0.4. Nor did the cultural factor interact with any
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Figure 4.4. RTs by block
Cross-Cultural Clustering of DTTCs. As in Experiment 1, we clustered based on dual-
task trial costs. The clustering revealed that except for one aberrant case, each participant
belonged to one or another of three principal clusters in a space defined by individual
pairs of mean DTTCs. Cluster 1 contained a preponderance of participants whose mean
DTTCs were relatively low (M ≤ 80 msec) for both the AV and VM tasks; they apparently
tended to perform the two tasks simultaneously without extreme dual-task interference. In
contrast, Cluster 2 contained participants whose mean DTTCs were considerably higher
for the VM task (M = 328 msec) than AV task (M = 133 msec), tending more toward
sequential performance with the AV task having first priority. Complementarily, Cluster
3 contained participants whose mean DTTCs were considerably higher for the AV task
(M = 225 msec) than VM task (M = 131 msec), reversing the priorities for sequential
performance manifested by Cluster 2.
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Figure 4.5. Cluster of individual participants
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The distribution of participants across these three clusters depended systematically on
culture. A large majority (68%) of the participants in Cluster 1 were Japanese, whereas a
large majority (86%) of the participants in Cluster 2 were Americans, and there was also a
majority (56%) of Americans in Cluster 3. This overall cultural contingency was reliable;
χ2(2) = 6.42, p < 0.05, supporting our a priori hypothesis that members of collectivist
societies differ from those of individualistic societies in their proneness to simultaneous
rather than sequential task scheduling.
However, it must be stressed that preferences for particular scheduling strategies and
the ability to implement them are not uniform within either Japanese or North American
cultures. Reinforcing this proviso, Figure 4.6 shows scatterplots of paired DTTCs from
individual dual-task trials for various participants (Panels A-D) who belonged to Clusters
1, 2, and 3, respectively. The participant in Panel A, a Japanese member of Cluster 1, had
DTTC pairs clumped relatively close to the zero origin, manifesting essentially simultane-
ous multitasking. A few Americans had DTTCs from individual dual-task trials that looked
like this Japanese participant’s DTTC. Unlike him, though, the participant in Panel B, an
American member of Cluster 2, had DTTC pairs mostly scattered near the vertical axis as
if the AV task was usually performed before the VM task. Also, the participant in Panel C,
an American member of Cluster 3, had some DTTC pairs scattered near the vertical axis,
but even more of his DTTC pairs were scattered near the horizontal axis, indicating that
he tended more often to perform the VM task before the AV task rather than vice versa.
Complementing this pattern, the participant in Panel D, a Japanese member of Cluster 3,
had DTTC pairs scattered mostly parallel to but slightly below the positive diagonal, man-
ifesting another “mixed” sequential strategy that favored the VM task.
Points. US participants earned on average 50,323 points, which did not differ from the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.6. Scatterplots of dual-task trial costs for individual dual-task trials
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4.3.3 Discussion
Results in Experiment 2 were consistent with those in Experiment 1: Japanese partici-
pants had less dual-task cost than Americans, but without any corresponding gain in points
earned. The individual-subject analyses were even more clear in this experiment, as there
were fewer participants who struggled so mightily with the simplified color task, as again
we found the three clusters we found in our initial sub-cluster in Experiment 1, and we
found that participants from each culture differed in what clusters they tended to be in.
The fact that the clusters were consistent with our notion that Japanese would tend to
choose a parallel strategy and Americans tended to choose sequential strategy certainly
helps our hypotheses. The trial-by-trial analyses of all trials was even more compelling,
showing clear structure consistent with sequential or parallel strategy.
Experiments 1 and 2 were thus consistent with our hypotheses that culture can affect
strategy.
4.4 Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 looked at performing two tasks simultaneously, i.e. time-sharing.
However, another form of multi-tasking we can look at is task-switching. Initially, it seems
that because you only do one task at a time, a sequential strategy would be optimal, favoring
Americans. So we predicted that if you compare Americans who switch between tasks with
Japanese who switch between tasks, Americans should have less switch costs.
4.4.1 Method
Participants. Twenty-four Japanese students at Kyoto University and 24 European-American
students at the University of Michigan participated as paid volunteers. They received pay-
ments for participation and earned monetary bonuses for good performance.
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Apparatus and Design. The apparatus and experimental design were the same as before.
The stimuli were the same as for the Visual-Manual task in Experiment 1. Although the
stimuli were the same regardless of task, participants were primed as to which task to
perform by the color of the fixation. The fixation dashes were either green or red, indicating
which set of stimulus-response pairs participants needed to use. The blocks had a Pure
Green block, where every trial had a green fixation and required the green S-R responses
and a corresponding Pure Red block. On a Dual-Block, there were twenty-four trials with
12 red trials and 12 green trials, randomly interspersed.
Procedure. For each trial, 4 green or red horizontal dashes appeared on the video display
for 500 msec. Then one of the four stimuli from Experiment 1 appeared on screen for up
to 2000 msec or until the participant made a response. The participant then received 500
msec of visual feedback about response accuracy on the trial.
In addition, participants received visual feedback after every trial block. It summarized
their performance on the block, including total correct responses, mean RTs for each task,
number of “too slow” responses for each task, and points earned for each task. Participants
were instructed to maximize their bonus points and monetary rewards.
4.4.2 Results
Outliers were removed based on bits transmitted per second, as in Experiments 1 and 2.
One US and one Japanese participant were removed from further analyses.
All results taken from Session 2 only, excluding the first block to get participants re-
oriented to the experiment. Because we found no difference in performance for the green
and red tasks, all results were collapsed across these tasks.
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Table 4.3. Comparison of mean RTs across cultures
Reaction Times. On average, RTs for the no-switch trials on Mixed Blocks were not
significantly greater than RTs for the Pure Blocks (M=584 and 549, respectively, t(94)
1.63, ns). RTs for the switch trials on Mixed Blocks (M = 641) were significantly larger
than for trials on the Pure Blocks, t(94) = 3.68, p < .001. Reaction times for switch trials
were significantly larger than for no-switch trials, t(94) = 2.11, p < .05.
Japanese and American participants did not differ in Pure RT (M = 527 and M = 571,
respectively, t(46) = 1.61, ns). The US Mixing Cost of 46 msec was significantly larger
than the Japanese Mixing Cost of 24 msec (t(46) = 2.04, p < .05, and the US Switch Cost
of 74 msec was significantly larger than the Japanese Switch Cost of 39 msec (t(46) = 2.56,
p < .05.
ANCOVA results were also used to control for Pure RT differences. When we control
for Pure RT, then Switch Cost is still significant, t(45) = 2.12, p<.05, and Pure RT does not
significantly differ across cultures in this model. If we control Pure RT when looking at the
Mixing Cost, then culture is no longer significant t(45) = 1.46, p=ns, but Pure RT becomes
highly significant, t(45) = 2.94, p<.01.
Error Rates. ERs were larger than in Experiments 1 and 2 (M = 9.53%). Fewer errors
occurred on pure-task trials (M = 6.76%) than no-switch trials (M = 9.24%, t(94) = 2.18,
p<.05) and switch-trials (M = 12.60%, t(94) = 3.88, p<.001). There were fewer errors on
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no-switch trials than switch trials, as well (t(94) = 2.18, p<.05). Americans did commit
slightly more errors (M = 10.1%) than did Japanese (M = 8.9%), but the difference was not
reliable, t(46) < 1, p > .5. Culture did not interact with any other effect on ERs, (p > 0.4
in all cases).
Cross-Cultural Clustering. As in Experiment 2, we clustered using PAM based on dual-
task costs, here Mixing Costs and Switch Costs. We initially found that two clusters were
optimal, with an average silhouette width of .482. We then examined one of the sub-
clusters. We found, as in Experiment 2, that 3 sub-clusters were optimal, with an average
silhouette width of 0.47. Figure 4.7 shows a plot of individual subjects in the sub-cluster.
Although it is harder to interpret these clusters compared to those in Experiment, of most
concern to us is Cluster 1, the cluster of individuals who have no Mixing Cost and no
Switch Cost. In this cluster, 75% are Japanese. The distribution of individuals in these
three clusters is marginally significant, χ2(2) = 5.86, p = 0.053.
This sub-cluster of parallel participants gives the initial impression that Japanese have
less switch-cost than Americans. However, if we combine the other two sub-clusters (which
we assume have some form of sequential strategy, or at least a non-parellel strategy), these
11 American participants have significantly less switch costs (M = 37.3 msec) than these
9 Japanese participants (M = 53.8 msec), t(18) = 2.29, p< .05. Mixing costs for the two
non-parallel sub-clusters did not differ (t(18) = 1.19, p = ns).
If instead we just remove the parallel cluster, but look at all remaining participants (not
just those in the sub-clusters above, but including those in the original cluster), we do not
find a significant difference in switch or mixing costs. Americans do have slightly larger
switch costs, M = 75.5, compared to the Japanese participants, M = 66.4, t(30) = 0.59,
p>0.5. Mixing costs for Americans (M=41.5) also did not differ compared to those of the
Japanese (M=35.6), t(30)=0.46, p>0.5.
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Figure 4.7. Subcluster of individual subjects
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Points. Japanese participants averaged 49,948 points, slightly more than the American
average of 47,912 points, but this difference was not significant, t(48) = 0.70, p=ns. How-
ever, of more interest is the average points in the sub-clusters. In the parallel sub-cluster,
Japanese averaged 47,733, basically the same as the American average of 47,400 points
(t(10)=0.04, p=ns). In the two sequential sub-clusters, Americans averaged slightly more
points (M=51,800) than did the Japanese (M=48,689), although this difference was not
significant (t(18) = 0.96, p=ns).
4.4.3 Discussion
Our initial results that Japanese had less switch costs than Americans surprised us. But
closer analysis of our data supported our hypothesis that Americans favor sequential strate-
gies and have less switch costs than Japanese. When we compared Japanese who clearly
switched between tasks with Americans who clearly switched, we found Americans had
less switch costs. We also found more Americans than Japanese who engaged in a clear
switching strategy, consistent with our hypotheses.
The reason our overall results were not as we initially expected is that numerous par-
ticipants adopted a parallel strategy that we did not anticipate, which required no task-
switching. These participants adopted a parallel strategy whereby they held two rule sets
in parallel, so they had absolutely no interference, neither switching nor mixing-cost. It
was not surprising that these participants with no switching or mixing-cost tended to be
Japanese participants. The fact is this parallel strategy is clearly more optimal than a se-
quential strategy, as it results in no costs. So the fact that not all participants chose this
strategy seems to contradict our findings from Chapter 2. However, the problem may be
our training and instructions encouraged participants to switch between tasks. Our English
instructions actually used the word “switch” in it, and thus word alone may have prevented
Western participants from considering parallel strategies. Our Japanese instructions used
the Japanese translation of “switch,” but the word may not have the same connotation in a
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culture where people favor parallel strategies and so are more likely to search the strategy
space to find a parallel strategy.
Our evidence would have been more compelling if we found that Americans had less
switch costs than Japanese across all other participants except those who engaged in the
parallel strategy. We did not, largely because there seemed to be more variance in the
American population than in the Japanese population. The American population had three
participants who were potential outliers, but because there were three of them, there was
no good statistical test that would remove all three of them. The Japanese population, in
contrast, had one potential outlier (although outlier tests came up negative). Americans, for
example, had six participants with switch costs greater than 100 msec, Japanese had one.
The fact is, in both cultures, it is hard to interpret these participants. Are they trying, or are
they content with the base pay? If we are arguing that one culture is better on average than
sequential tasks, then should we care about the tail about the distribution that skews the
mean? Examining the sub-cluster constrains the variance so that it is roughly equal across
the two cultures, and these are participants who are trying hard in the task. The fact we had
roughly equal number of participants from each culture in these sub-clusters is yet another
reason why we should take these results seriously.
4.5 General Discussion
The principal objective of the present research has been to explore cross-cultural differ-
ences in multitasking, thereby addressing fundamental questions about the diversity of
human information processing, heterogeneity of cognitive architectures, and adaptability
of task-scheduling strategies. Taken overall, our results suggest that members of a collec-
tivist society (i.e., Japanese culture) lean more toward simultaneous multitasking than do
members of an individualistic society (i.e., American culture), who instead tend to favor se-
quential multitasking. This finding, which manifests distributed versus selective ąřattention
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to actionąś, extends prior discoveries about how cultural practices may influence attention
to perception and cognition (Kitayama et al., 2003; Nisbett et al., 2001).
Our three experiments all showed that Japanese participants had less costs associated
with simultaneously performing two tasks than did American participants. In Experiment
3, although only one task was performed at a time, participants could still show proclivity in
performing two tasks simultaneously if they could hold two different rule sets in mind with-
out interference. Comparing reaction times results for each culture in Experiments 1 and 2
showed that Japanese participants had less costs and thus less interference in time-sharing
than did American participants. Clustering individual participants indicated that in both
experiments people seemed to adopt one of four strategies: 1) A strategy that required little
cost for both tasks, a parallel strategy 2) A strategy that required little cost for the tone task,
but greater cost for the visual-manual task, a sequential strategy 3) A strategy that required
little cost for the visual-manual task, but greater cost for the tone task, a sequential strategy,
or 4) a strategy that required relatively large cost for the visual-manual and tone task. The
first strategy was a parallel strategy that allowed both tasks to be processed simultaneously
as much as possible. In both experiments, we found more Japanese engaged in this type of
strategy, consistent with the notion of using a more holistic attentional strategy. The other
two strategies are more sequential, indicating you first process one task and then do the
other task. Not surprisingly if Americans allocate attention more analytically, Americans
tended to disproportionately engage in these two strategies. We found a similar pattern in
Experiment 3, as well, with Japanese participants more likely to engage in a strategy that
resulted in neither switching or mixing-costs, hence indicating being able to hold both rule
sets in mind with no interference.
It may be argued that Japanese advantages in simultaneous multitasking reflects a ge-
netic difference from Americans (for example, task-switching has already been argued to
be largely genetic, see Friedman et al., 2008). Although possible that Americans are more
likely to have a cognitive response-selection “bottleneck” that constrains Americans to use
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sequential multitasking strategies, (cf. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a,b), we find this unlikely. For
one thing, in all our experiments we found that some Americans did indeed perform the
two tasks simultaneously as well as any Japanese participant, and we found some Japanese
participants performed the tasks sequentially. Another reason is that training can improve
performance on simultaneous tasks and other forms of holistic attention (Gopher, 1993;
Green & Bavelier, 2006; Polk & Farah, 1998). Further, the predilection for simultaneous
multitasking does not seem to be unique to East Asians, but to other collectivist cultures as
well (Chavay & Rogoff, 1999). Although to really ensure these differences are not genetic
in nature, future research should examine Asian-Americans, especially 3rd or 4th gener-
ation Asian-Americans who should be more heavily influenced by American culture than
Japanese culture and thus favor sequential strategies.
A possible criticism is that Japanese participants put forth more effort than did Amer-
ican participants. We included points earned in the results analyses to help refute this
line of criticism. If Japanese participants were really trying harder, than they should have
earned more points since that is what participants were striving to maximize. However, this
clearly wasn’t the case in Experiment 2 and 3. In Experiment 1, Japanese did earn a bit
more points, but this effect disappeared when we examined participants in the sub-cluster.
More importantly, the fact that the results in Experiment 1 were replicated in Experiment
2, which did not have a difference in points earned, indicates that motivation differences
did not account for the behavioral differences. Further, the fact that the minimum cost
on any given trial did not differ across cultures, as we predicted, is further evidence that
participants were trying hard in both cultures.
In fact, Experiment 3 offers further refutation of the motivation argument. We predicted
a priori that Americans would be better at task-switching than Japanese, due to having
more extensive practice in sequential strategies, and so should have less switch-costs than
Japanese. Although overall we did not find this to be the case, close examination of the
data revealed that was because so many Japanese discovered a parallel strategy we did not
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consider. Our hypothesis did not factor in those participants, so instead we examined those
participants who engaged in a sequential strategy. There we found Americans had lower
switch costs and earned more points than Japanese participants who engaged in the same
strategy. Although the points did not significantly differ, the fact that Americans had a
trend to earn more certainly refutes any hypothesis that effort differed across cultures.
More research is needed to establish how general our results are. Higher-level multi-
tasking, such as driving and using a cell phone, should be investigated, along with lower-
level multitasking as in the Psychological-Refractory Period (PRP) procedure. Further,
more tasks should be investigated and designed to favor sequential strategies over simul-
taneous strategies, to both clarify Western participants’ advantages in multitasking, and to
help examine the extent to which training can affect how people choose their multitasking
strategy. It would be interesting to design experiments such that simultaneous or sequential
strategies were clearly dominant, and then see if individuals regardless of culture attempted
the corresponding proper strategy. Also, as mentioned above, it would be interesting to ex-
amine Asian-Americans and Westerners who have lived in Japan over a period of many
years, to help refute possible genetic accounts.
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Chapter 5
Cultural Differences in Optimal
Adaptations in Ordered Responses
In Chapter 2, we examined how individuals adapt in a simple-RT task, and we found that
participants generally adapted in a mathematically-optimal way to maximize their total
points. However, in Chapter 4, we discovered that culture influenced people’s strategic
choices. Although the tasks in Chapter 4 involved relatively complicated multitasking, and
we had a priori reasons to assume that multitasking strategies may differ across cultures, it
could be that culture plays a role in cognitive experiments in general.
Hence the data from Chapter 2 provide us with a control for this hypothesis. When
we ran the experiments on optimal adaptations in ordered responses, we did not consider
culture, but we serendipitously included participants from different cultures. After finding
out there were cultural differences in multitasking, we decided to reexamine our results
from Experiments 2 and 3 of Chapter 2 in terms of cultural differences. We had no reason
to assume there would be cultural differences, and in fact we expected that people from all
cultures should adapt equally well.
Despite the fact that we expect a null result, a significant difference or even trend across
cultures would be an interesting finding. Depending on the nature of the findings, it may
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affect our interpretations of Chapter 4. It would also show other experimenters that taking
culture into account is important for analyzing results from RT experiments. If we do
not find any differences across cultures, this would indicate that we did a good job of
constraining the strategy space so that there was one clear strategy regardless of cultural
background.
Unfortunately, our original experimental design only allowed us to do a limited set
of statistical tests for cultural differences. In Chapter 4, we looked at only two cultures:
European-American and East Asian. Here, though, we had to further subdivide the partici-
pants since we also had African-American and South Asian participants. South Asians are
not from a collectivist culture, so we did not want to aggregate them with East Asians. Like-
wise, we did not want to combine African-American participants with European-American
participants, as we did not test African-Americans in our previous multitasking experi-
ments.
We found no evidence for cultural differences in these experiments.
5.0.1 Method
The method was the same as in Experiments 2 and 3 from Chapter 2.
5.0.2 Results
We combined the data from Experiments 2 and 3 in order to ensure that we had enough
participants from each culture. We ended up with 11 East Asian participants, 11 African-
American participants, 18 European-Americans, 6 South Asians, and 1 Hispanic (who was
removed from subsequent analyses due to having too small a sample size). Note that the
participants from each culture were not separated equally across payoffs and external-noise
levels, so this results in potential confounds we have to be wary of when examining our
results.
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We first examined how far from optimal each culture was on average. Americans av-
eraged 12.2 msec too short for optimal, East Asians averaged 4.5 msec too short, African
Americans averaged averaged 1.7 msec too long, and South Asians averaged 0.4 msec too
long. The difference between Americans and East Asians was the critical difference, and
this was not significant, t(27) = 0.63, p> 0.5. Because Americans and East Asians may not
have been represented equally across our different groups, any cultural difference would be
confounded with the level of total noise, which we found to have the biggest effect on how
far away participants were from optimal, we ran an ANCOVA where we controlled for total
noise. We again found that after controlling for total noise, culture was still not significant,
t(26) = 0.58, p > 0.5. If we included African-American and South Asian cultures in our
analysis, our results did not change.
The main reason that Americans seemed to differ from East Asians is because Amer-
icans had 12 participants in the accuracy payoff (where participants tended to be too fast)
and only six participants in the speed payoff (where, if different from optimal, participants
tended to be too slow). East Asians did not have this skew, with five participants in accu-
racy and six in the speed payoff. Hence this disproportion probably accounts for why the
cultures have a slight (albeit nonsignificant) difference in their deviation from optimal IRI.
As in Experiment 2, we examined difference from optimal IRI as a function of to-
tal noise, but this time took into account culture (see Figure 5.1). From this figure, we
can see that there was a good spread of cultures in the different conditions and pay-
offs, although we ended up with four East Asians in the high-noise condition, but only
two European-Americans. In all levels of noise, though, there are both East Asians and



































Figure 5.1. Individuals differences from optimal IRI, by culture
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5.0.3 Discussion
Neither median RT nor the individual scatterplot showed a trend for cultural differences in
making optimal adaptations for ordered responses. Nor was there any trend once we took
into account total-noise level and payoff.
Hence this reanalysis of Experiment 2 showed that in many cases, culture may not
affect results. This is not really surprising; we are all human after all. Nevertheless, it
shows the importance of considering in what types of tasks culture matters and must be
carefully controlled, and in what types of tasks culture does not matter.
If the experimenters manage to carefully control the strategy space, then culture does
not matter, as all participants will opt for the same strategy. If, however, the strategy space
is broader so there are multiple optimal strategies from which to choose, culture and other
higher-level constructs like personality may matter. In multitasking, we know culture in-
deed does matter. Independent cultures favor more sequential strategies, while interdepen-
dent cultures favor more simultaneous strategies. In simple-RT experiments, though, both




The importance of strategy recurs throughout cognitive psychology. Even if the research
question at first glance seems to have nothing to do with strategy, the strategy people opt
for influences what conclusions an experimenter can and will deduce. It is thus critical to
study strategy not just for its own sake, but to allow other researchers to control for strategy
when interpreting their own experiments. For example, neuroimaging techniques such as
fMRI and ERP are often used to try to answer some of the fundamental questions about
cognition and about its limitations. However, a confound exists because those neuroimag-
ing techniques will measure brain activity not only associated with the effect of interest,
but also brain activity associated with choosing and implementing a strategy. If the data is
analyzed at the individual level, it is possible that different strategies could be ascertained
(e.g. Schumacher et al., 2001), and then possibly strategies could be controlled for so that
brain regions associated with the effect of interest may be differentiable from the given
strategic decision. However, this typically results in too few data points per strategy to
yield meaningful results, which is why this is not typically done in neuroimaging studies.
Over the course of this dissertation, we first determined what guides a person’s strategy,
namely the maximization of points they earn (Chapter 2). We made use of this in two ways
in Chapter 3. On the one hand we spent considerable effort in designing a payoff that
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encouraged participants to prioritize Task 2 while still trying to quickly perform Task 1,
because we knew that participants would adapt to the payoff as well as they could. On
the other hand, we also chose which strategies in our computational models were optimal
by comparing payoffs across those strategies. Again, we felt confident that participants
were trying to maximize their points, so we felt that comparing points was the most fair
method to compare different strategies. In Chapter 3 we expanded the application of the
Strategic Response Deferment (SRD) model (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a) by finding that it
was a good fit not just for Psychological Refractory Period tasks, but also for novel task-
interruption tasks. Although our results were inconclusive about whether or not there was
a Response-Selection Bottleneck, our best fit was via a strategy-based model.
In Chapter 4, we attempted to discern some of the factors that fostered some of the
individual differences we find in selecting strategies, and we found strong evidence that
culture heavily influences what strategy individuals select. To interpret our results, we made
use of the fact that participants chose the strategy that maximized the points they earned
(Chapter 2) and that people experimented with many different strategies in multitasking
studies (Chapter 3). In Chapter 5, we found that when a reaction time task was designed
so that optimal strategy was the same for every participant, cultural differences in strategy
selection disappeared and behavioral results no longer differed.
Integration of these chapters suggests many implications for understanding how people
select their strategies for reaction-time tasks. First, we demonstrated how important it is
to give people clear goals, e.g. to maximize the number of points they can earn. Then we
showed ways of analyzing strategies in a complex task to help disentangle the complicated
interactions of strategies and structural limitations, in order to understand the true limi-
tations of the mind. We also found further evidence that multitasking results are heavily
influenced by strategic decisions on where to set up locking points to prevent response-
reversal (or order) errors. Finally, we showed that in complicated tasks where different
strategies can be optimal, culture influences the strategies people choose.
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It should be clear that to help discern speed-accuracy tradeoffs, we need to consider all
of these facets. Payoff matters not just in psychology but in real-world tasks as well. There
are likely more crashes per mile in autoracing than in routine driving, despite the fact that
race-car drivers are highly attuned to their driving, are very skilled, and have great reflexes,
all conditions that are missing in many real-world drivers. Yet, obviously, race-car drivers
emphasize speed over accuracy, which explains why they are in a disproportionate number
of accidents. The first step in understanding speed-accuracy tradeoffs is to make sure that
we understand the real implications of the payoff that is guiding the participant. Without
seriously considering the payoff, we cannot be sure if the results we obtain are caused by
poor performance, cognitive constraints on that task, or strategic considerations.
After we have considered the implications of the payoffs, we have to consider how to
analyze the strategies used in relatively complicated tasks. For both low and high-level
tasks, this can involve breaking the task down into stages (Sternberg, 1969a,b). In higher-
level tasks, this may require a flowchart. We then have to manipulate the stages to really
understand what affects performance. For example, in Chapter 3, changing the stimulus-
encoding time of our Task 1 stimulus did not affect performance in Task 2, but changing the
response-selection difficulty of Task 1 did. Understanding how to parse tasks allows us to
better understand what strategies are being chosen and what factors cannot be strategically
varied.
Once we have thought about how to analyze strategies, we have to be aware of the
vast number of unconscious influences that affect what strategy people choose for common
tasks. Culture is rarely salient to most of us, except when we leave our own culture. As a
result, often neither experimenters nor participants consider how much culture affects peo-
ple. Yet growing evidence finds that culture influences everything from perceptual tasks
(e.g., Chua et al., 2005; Miyamoto et al., 2006) to high-level decision making (Yates et al.,
2002). It is therefore not surprising that culture influences strategic choices on basic cog-
nitive tasks; culture needs to be considered by cognitive psychologists when they attempt
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to analyze and design their own experiments.
There are, of course, many factors besides culture that affect what strategies an individ-
ual chooses. Personality has been shown to have an effect on how a person selects a choice
along the speed-accuracy tradeoff (Dickman & Meyer, 1988). It seems likely that gender
should affect strategies in certain tasks, although we found no evidence of gender effects
in our experiments. Videogame experience has been shown to affect visuospatial atten-
tion (Green & Bavelier, 2006), so video-game experience is likely to affect what strategies
would be optimally chosen on many tasks. It may be that being from an urban, suburban or
rural setting may also affect what strategies you choose on many given tasks. Ultimately,
researchers have to be aware of these factors, if only to control for different strategies so
that we can progress toward a meaningful, unified theory of cognition.
Our findings also have broad real-world applications. As discussed earlier, a warning
system for people in certain jobs where both tasks are critical may cause a sharp detriment
in performance on the initial task and make the person slow to respond. To ensure a quick
response, the warning system must be well designed to result in no motor interference, as
well as only interrupt when the initial task is not in immediate mode. Cultural differences
may guide how we design things to maximize efficiency to take advantage of people’s
preferred strategies, i.e., design products that favor sequential strategies for Americans and
simultaneous strategies for East Asians. And even our basic cognitive experiment may
have broad real-world applications: the importance of guiding strategies and giving people
proper feedback about how they are doing, as we did via points. It may, for instance, be
better to teach people musical instruments via a points system (as in the popular video game
Guitar Hero™) so they can measure their improvement.
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